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Article 6

THE ROAD TO THE BENCH: NOT EVEN GOOD (SUBLIMINAL)
INTENTIONS

LATEEF MTIMAt

INTRODUCTION

"Speak thou with us, andwe will hear...."Exodus 20:19.

In the beginning, the drafters of a particular state constitution mandated
that the number of judgeships allocated to each of its towns and cities would be
determined by size of population, and that individual judges would then be
elected by popular vote. The state has always had both black and white citizens,
but in the days in which blacks were effectively denied the right to vote, even in
those areas of the state where blacks constituted a majority of the population,
only whites were ever elected to the bench.
When the federal constitutional rights of black Americans began to be legally recognized and enforced, however, some whites in the state feared that
black judges would completely replace white judges in those towns and cities in
which blacks constituted a majority. These fears may have been somewhat allayed when a previously unexploited loophole in the state constitution was det Associate Professor, Howard University School of Law (HUSL); J.D. Harvard Law School. I would
like to express my appreciation to Dean Alice Gresham Bullock and the Howard University School of Law
for financial support in connection with the research and preparation of this Article. I would like to extend
my gratitude to Natalie Brown, HUSL '00, Pamela Carpenter, HUSL '02, Leslie Chambers, HUSL '02, and
Nyasha Robinson, HUSL '02, for their dedicated and insightful research, and to my HUSL colleagues
Steven D. Jamar, Warner Lawson, Jr., Laurence Nolan, and Andrew E. Taslitz, and Laura Wilkinson of

Clifford, Chance, Rogers & Wells, for their invaluable comments in connection with various drafts of this
Article. Finally, special thanks to Warner, Laurence, Laura, and Nyasha for the many thoughtful, encouraging, and patient hours of commentary, critique and conversation throughout the preparation of this work.
Any errors are my own.
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ployed by whites in the state legislature. You see, the state constitution permitted the appointment of an unlimited number of "temporary" judges to the
bench whenever they were needed to address heavy judicial backlogs. So, for the
next thirty years, the state's governors, all of whom were white, appointed dozens of "temporary" judges, most of whom were also white and many of whom
held their "temporary" positions on the bench for decades.
Even a casual observer could easily conclude that, with regard to the election of the state judiciary, state law had been manipulated in a way that diminished the rights of black taxpayers. The attitude of some state officials was:
"Where they have the numbers, let the blacks elect their own judges." But constitutional compliance notwithstanding, there will also always be plenty of qualified white judges available to fill the slots-especially, perhaps, in connection
with those cases in which it appears doubtful that a black judge is likely to reach
the "right" decision. Thus, for some three decades, two essentially separate and
presumably unequal roads to the bench were maintained throughout the state.
Which antebellum or Jim Crow state in America's historic South does the
foregoing tableau describe? Unfortunately the state in question is not only outside the South, but the relevant period is neither ante-bellum, nor Jim Crow, nor
even the pre-Civil Rights Era. The state described above is New York in the last
three decades of the twentieth century.
This Article will discuss how covert, subjective, and subliminal racial biases
combine with and even replace the more traditional obstacles to equitable African American participation in the present-day justice system. These biases limit
the number of black judges and also foster and replicate racial bias against
blacks throughout other aspects of the judicial selection and appointment process. First, this Article will briefly recount the historical exclusion of African
Americans from the judiciary prior to the Civil Rights Era. Next, the lack of
proportionate increase in African American representation within the judiciary
in the post-Civil Rights Era will be examined. It is this lack of proportional progress, despite the removal of many dejure barriers to black participation, which
implicates the issue of covert and subliminal racial bias, and it is the special obstacle that this form of discrimination presents to blacks competing for positions of high social, political, and professional prestige that will be specifically
explored.
In addition, this Article will propose as one means of addressing the resulting disproportionately small number of black judges, that greater attention be
paid to the meaningful inclusion of African Americans within the nation's elite
corporate law firms and similar professional positions. From a strategic standpoint, these entities offer a logical target for this kind of affirmative diversification initiative. As compared with much of the rest of the legal profession, the
continued lack of genuine racial integration within these firms is increasingly
difficult to explain or defend, at least in accordance with post-Civil Rights Era
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mores. Indeed, it is not entirely hyperbole to say that, even today, most of
America's major corporate law firms, as well as many "in-house" corporate

counsel departments, remain almost as lily white as a pre-Civil Rights Era country dub. In terms of proportionate inclusion of Afican Americans into their
ranks, the elite corporate law firms remain some thirty years behind not only
most of the legal profession, but much of American society.
Perhaps even more important, meaningful diversification of these particular
professional environments will provide equal opportunity for black lawyers to
demonstrate their abilities to perform in highly competitive and professionally
challenging positions of significant responsibility and authority. This will better
enable black judicial aspirants to obtain the kind of professional experience generally regarded as a necessary complement to the political connections that are
typically prerequisite to a position on the bench. Indeed, because these firms
serve as an important professional "pipeline" to the judiciary and other positions
of authority in American society, this would also give black lawyers greater access to many of the legal, business, and political conduits of power. Greater
access to these conduits is necessary to forge the strategic alliances essential to
attaining judicial office.
Finally, meaningful diversification of these influential legal entities is also
likely to provide a less direct, but no less important, benefit with respect to the
racial attitudes of many present and future non-black jurists, as well as other
members of the legal profession. One often overlooked byproduct of the exclusion of blacks from the professional environments, in which many other lawyers
must "cut their teeth" before becoming judges, is that it increases the likelihood
that the ultimate pool of judges will be disproportionately composed of individuals who have had little professional interaction with black attorneys as peers.
Lacking these and other relevant opportunities to broaden their racial perspectives and experiences, these lawyers are more likely to carry outmoded racial
attitudes with them as they ascend to the bench. Bringing racial diversity to the
elite corporate law firms and similar professional settings will not only enhance
judicial and other professional opportunities for blacks, but can also provide
many non-black lawyers, including those who will eventually nominate, appoint,
or serve as judges, with the kind of continuous professional interaction with
black lawyers that can be critical to overcoming both conscious prejudice as well
as subliminal racial biases.
WHEREAT LIES THE RoAD... ?

There are many reasons why some Americans today do not believe that
black Americans have the same opportunities for legal justice in America as do
white Americans. As the foregoing revelations with respect to the New York
judicial selection process suggest, one basis for these beliefs stems from suspicions regarding the racial make-up of the American bench. For one thing, the
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percentage of judges in America who are black is much smaller than the percentage of blacks in the population overall. In light of the history of race in
American society, including manipulations of legal and governmental processes
such as the one described above, many people understandably believe that the
paucity of black judges is a deliberate and significant limitation upon the opportunities for black participants in the judicial system to receive equitable treatment.
Others observe that the actual number of black judges is not the sole or
even the most salient issue with respect to the question of race and the judiciary.
Certainly it should not be the case that for any American seeking legal redress,
whatever her color, her best hope for receiving a fair dispensation is to appear
before a judge of her own race. It is thus argued that to improve the availability
of equitable legal justice for black Americans it is not enough to work toward a
judiciary that is more racially representative. It may be even more important to
impact the very racial perspectives that spur some whites and others to vitiate
the judicial selection process in the first place, especially when one considers
that some of these same people will themselves one day become judges and will
preside over controversies involving black litigants or parties represented by
black counsel.
One key factor that significantly impacts the issue of race and the American
bench with respect to both proportionate racial representation as well as the
racial attitudes of some white and other non-black judges is the traditional career
path that most candidates must follow in order to become a judge. Probably the
most important prerequisite to obtaining judicial office is the forging of significant political "connections," whether through political party activity, formal
government service, or professional activity in local and national bar associations. Indeed, such connections are especially important with respect to the federal bench, because there are no elected positions in the federal judiciary.
In addition to having effective political connections, however, experience in
certain practice areas and environments, particularly the large-and extremely
influential-corporate law firms, has also been traditionally favored in assessing
a lawyer's suitability to ascend to the position of judge. Validly or not, the training offered by such firms is generally considered first-rate by those appointing
or nominating judges. Often within these powerful professional enclaves, many
aspiring young lawyers are first exposed to the legal, business, and political powerbrokers with whom they must become allied if they are to become serious
judicial contenders.
Initially, it would seem then that the very nature of the traditional career
path to a judgeship at least partially accounts for the inability of blacks and some
other minorities to obtain equitable representation within, and treatment by, the
judiciary. Until fairly recently, blacks were simply not permitted to participate in
most of those professional and political endeavors considered essential to quali-
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fying for judicial office. Often denied the right even to vote, blacks previously
wielded little political clout. And prior to the 1970s, the African American presence in major corporate law firms and similar professional environments was all
but nonexistent. Thus, the exclusion of blacks from the relevant political and
preparatory professional activities made it difficult for African Americans to
travel the traditional road toward qualifying for the bench. The absence of
blacks from judicial positions, in turn, reinforced widely held beliefs that blacks
were not suitable to fill them.
It would be difficult to deny, however, that much progress has been made
in many of these and related areas of society since the Civil Rights Era. African
Americans have made concrete advances in the American political arena and
have also achieved significant increases in law school enrollments over the past
thirty years. Nonetheless, this progress has yet to result in anything even dose to
proportionate or equitable representation of African Americans within the
American judiciary.
This lack of proportionate increase in the number of black judges, together
with the contention that some current political, social, and judicial attitudes toward blacks often remain less than progressive, suggests that the removal of the
dejure obstacles that impeded African American access to the judiciary has only
partially redressed the problem. Blacks are no longer formally denied pertinent
political and professional opportunities. The issue today is thus one of covert,
subjective, and even subliminalconcerns on the part of some non-blacks regarding the ability of blacks to preside fairly and competently over non-blacks or
otherwise to fulfill adequately the obligations of judicial and other authority positions.
Express aspirations of racial equality notwithstanding, if some members of
the legal profession retain covert and subconscious doubts about blacks, then
the opportunity to experience firsthand conduct and capabilities that contradict
such preconceptions is likely to prove an effective means of dispelling these
apprehensions. Routinely working with or being advised by African American
attorneys in connection with complex and high-profile legal matters and with
such black lawyers participating as fully accepted members of an elite (and therefore presumed competent) legal cadre will make the proposal of a black judicial
nominee an uncontroversial expectation.
Full participation in the elite corporate law firm arena will not only better
position black judicial hopefuls to obtain specific kinds of relevant professional
experience, but it will also provide black lawyers with greater opportunities to
forge the critical alliances prerequisite to actually attaining judicial office. Infusing genuine racial diversity into this particular professional context will also expose many non-black, elite professionals to an increased level of professional
interaction with black lawyers, which will better enable them to transcend any
conscious prejudices or subliminal racial biases that they may still retain. Indeed,
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the elimination of such lingering covert or subliminal perceptions of black lawyers and other black professionals may be one of the most important benefits to
be derived from diversifying the elite corporate law firm, as the issue of implidt
racial attitudes becomes increasingly important in post-Civil Rights American
society.
EXCLUSION FROM THE BENCH IN THE PRE-CiVIL RIGHTS ERA
Prior to the Civil Rights Era, African Americans were generally precluded
from holding judicial or other significant public office or, for that matter, from
undertaking many of the civil, social, or professional endeavors that most other
Americans took for granted as part of their birthright:
One of the main reasons that we are a democratic country ... is because of our insistence that virtually all our judicial officers be elected by the people or confirmed
by the elected representatives of the people. Such "mirror representation" . . . is
the essence of our democracy and underlies our guarantees for "equal justice under law." Yet it was 76 years after 1776 before the first black man in America was
permitted to occupy a judicial post. And it was another century before blacks in
any noticeable numbers were allowed to assume even a minor role as magistrates
in a few of our city and state courts. Thus, for all but the last decade of our entire
national existence, blacks have been virtually excluded from the judicial decisionmaking function in our society.

In many instances, there were express prohibitions 2 against blacks working
in certain capacities or engaging in many professional and business activities,
such as joining the American Bar Association, which were prerequisites to attaining such positions.3 Many of the nation's law schools did not admit blacks, 4
and even those blacks who were able to earn law degrees were not afforded the
full range of opportunities and privileges attendant to the profession. For example, it was not until 1943 that the dejure prohibition against black lawyers joining
their white peers in the powerful American Bar Association was lifted. However,

1. George W. Crockett, Jr., Black Judges and the Black JudicialExperience, 19 Wayne L Rev 61 (1972).
See also Patrick Winston Dunn, JudicialSelection in the States: A Critical Study with Prvposalsfor Reform, 4 Hofstra L Rev 267 (1976).
2. See States' Laws on Race and Color (Georgia 1950) (Pauli Murray, ed); Joanne Grant, Black Protest

148-54 (Fawcett 1968) (describing how reprinting laws in Louisiana and Mississippi expressly prohibited or
restricted black land ownership, freedom of employment or intermarriage with whites); Thomas W.
Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction: Undermining Black Landownership, Political Independence, and CommuniO, Through Partition Sales of Tenancies in Common, 95 Nw U L Rev 505, 526-32 (2001); Sherrilyn A. Ifill,
Judging the Judges: Racial Diversi, Imparhaliy and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 BC L Rev 95, 126
(1997); James W. Pearce, et al, African Americans in Large Law Firms: The Possible Cost of Exclusion, 42 Howard

LJ 59, 59-60 n 1 (1998).
3. Geraldine R. Segal, Blacks in the Law 17-18 (Pennsylvania 1983).
4. See J. Clay Smith, Jr., Emancipation: The Maki'ng of the Black Layer 1844-1944 38, 164, 240, 281
(Pennsylvania 1993).
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the ABA has played and continues to play a critical role in the judicial selection
candidate "approval ratings" to assist
process by, among other things, providing
5
in the evaluation of judicial nominees.
But even in the absence of such dejure barriers, it was usually unnecessary to
forbid blacks expressly from holding judicial or similar office.6 Effectively denied the right to vote, African Americans were thoroughly bereft of political
influence, a vital prerequisite to attaining judicial office:
[P]olitics continue to play a large role in the selection of judges in the United
States. In this country almost from the beginning appointments to offices traditionally have been the reward for party service. Where appointments are not used
as a direct prize for such activity they are an indirect recognition of the appointee's
political views as evidenced by his membership in the party, or of the services of
some other party member who favors the appointee ... Political influences on appointments are of prime importance not only in the federal courts but in all the

states where judges are appointed. In most states in which judges are not elected
and
partisan considerations play an important role in the selection of the judiciary
7

in appointments to the lower courts local political interests are favored.

Excluded from the political mainstream, blacks were simply not in a position to
develop or benefit from the kind of political patronage that traditionally opens
avenues to political appointments, or8 to engender the political backing essential
to a successful bid for elective office.
Moreover, prior to the 1970s, black lawyers did not enjoy large or influential
private practices. Most black lawyers were government employees, and those in
private practice worked primarily as sole practitioners, sometimes forming small
law firm partnerships but generally serving a very limited client base. Consequently the black private practitioner served a clientele composed principally of
individuals, and almost exclusively of blacks.9 Moreover, the practice areas in
which most African American lawyers did find work were limited and provided
few opportunities to forge influential relationships. Black lawyers had their largest practices in the areas of criminal law, personal injury, and domestic relations,
and found little to no opportunity in the commercial areas, like labor or tax

5. See Segal, Blacks in the Law at 17-18, 230 (cited in note 3); Patrice Pitts and Linda Vinson, Breakitg Down Barriers to the FederalBench: Reshaping the JudicialSelecton Process, 2 Harv BlackLetter L J 27, 30-31

(1985).
6. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregalion Decisions, 69 Yale LJ 421,425 (1960).
7. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Judges andJurors: Their Funtions,.Qualflcationsand Selection, 36 BU L Rev 1,
38-39 (1956). See also Glenn R. Winters, Selecion ofJudges in Ametica, 44 Tex L Rev 1081, 1083-84 (1966);
Dunn, 4 Hofstra L Rev at 298-99, 302 (cited in note 1).
8. Pitts and Vinson, 2 Harv BlackLetter LJ at 32 (cited in note 5).
9. See generally Richard L. Abel, Ameican Lawger 105 (Oxford 1989). See also Smith, Emandpation
at 11 (cited in note 4) ('With a few exceptions, the clientele of most black lawyers before and after the
Post-Reconstruction era were black, even in major cities with large ethnic populations."); Segal, Blacks in the
Law at 17 (cited in note 3).
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law. 10 "The opportunity of black lawyers in the free market was not free. Since
the white commercial community hardly ever used the services of black lawyers,
the black lawyers never developed wealth or influence in the commercial community."" Indeed, even "[b]lack [clients] often used black lawyers in almost
hopeless2 criminal matters but turned to white lawyers in the more lucrative civil
cases."1
Accordingly, significant commercial and corporate representations by black
lawyers were virtually nonexistent in the pre- and early Civil Rights Era. "[B]lack
sole practitioners surveyed in 1966 earned very little, even less than black lawyers employed in government-a reversal of the relationship among white lawyers .... Just as racial minorities have greater difficulty entering the profession
than either earlier immigrant groups or women, so they 1appear
to have greater
3
difficulty attaining the most desirable positions within it."'
Thus, the inherent structure of the road to judicial office was hostile to African American professional participation and progress. The traditional judicial
selection process emphasized professional qualifications and experience more
typically associated with the career patterns enjoyed by white attorneys, and it
valued the input of professional and political networks from which blacks were
historically excluded. Correspondingly, the selfsame barriers that blocked African American access to the educational and professional experiences valued in
judges also served to preserve the American bench almost exclusively for
14

whites.

Notwithstanding these social and political obstacles, it is important to note
that even prior to the civil rights advances that began in the 1960s, a few blacks
did become state court judges and some were even appointed to the federal
bench. Robert Morris was the nation's first black judge, appointed to the Magistrates Court in Boston, Massachusetts, in 1852. The first black appellate judge
was Jonathan Jasper Wright, who was elected to the South Carolina Supreme
Court in 1870. And the first black federal judicial officer was Robert H. Terrell,
appointed a Justice of the Peace in Washington, D.C., in 1901.15
With the advent of the Civil Rights Movement, blacks made important advances within the judiciary, not the least of which were the appointments of
Thurgood Marshall to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
and, of course, ultimately to the United States Supreme Court, and Constance B.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Segal, Blacks in the Law at 89 (cited in note 3).
Smith, Emancation at 11 (cited in note 4).
Id at 4.
Abel, American Lawjers at 107 (cited in note 9).
Pitts and Vinson, 2 Harv BlackLetter L J at 27 (cited in note 5); Segal, Blacks in the Law at 233

(cited in note 3).
15. Crockett, 19 Wayne L Rev at 66 (cited in note 1); Smith, Emancpation at 406, 422 (cited in note
4) (At age thirty-one, "Jane Matilda Bolin broke ground for all women when, in 1939, she became the first
black woman judge in American law.").
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Motley to the District Court for the Southern District of New York. Motley has
written:
[In 1966] I [became] the first black woman appointed to the federal bench ...
Eleven black men had been appointed to the federal bench: William H. Hastie to
the district court in the Virgin Islands in 1937 and to the District Court in Philadelphia in 1949; Irvin C. Mollison to the customs court in New York in 1945;
Scovel Richardson to the same customs court in 1957; Walter A. Gordon to the
district court in the Virgin Islands in 1958; James B. Parsons and Wade McCrae to
the district courts in Chicago and Detroit, respectively, in 1961; Leon B.
Higginbotham to the district court in Philadelphia in 1964; Spottswood W. Robinson III and William B. Bryant to the district court for the District of Columbia in
1964 and 1965, respectively, and James L. Watson to the custom court in New
York in 1966. Thurgood Marshall, of course, had been appointed to the Court of
Appeals for the
16 Second Circuit in 1961 but had not yet been appointed to the Supreme Court.

In light of these and other social, political, and legal changes brought about
by the Civil Rights Movement, many expected that the floodgates to judicial
opportunity would swing wide open for blacks and that, at the very least, the
rate of African American appointment and election to judicial office would remain commensurate with that of other social progress in the nation. "The civil
rights revolution succeeded in whittling away restrictions and penalties which
had barred blacks from participation in our social and political affairs ....These

factors, combined with increasing pressures to enforce more vigorously the
equal rights guarantees of our Constitution and its amendments, portend even
more significant changes in the future composition of those who administer
justice in our society."' 17 Unfortunately, long after the express constructs of
"separate but equal," Jim Crow, and "benign neglect" began to be dismantled, de
facto barriers to African American ascension to the bench would persist, precludrepresentation of blacks within the post-Civil
ing the anticipated proportionate
18
Rights American judiciary.

BLACK JUDGES iN THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA
The relationship between influential political connections and a successful
bid for judicial office has traditionally been fairly direct, and indeed so much so
that some commentators have questioned whether its significance sometimes
outweighs that of candidates' substantive merit. "In this country where so many
16. Constance B. Motley, EqualJusice Under Law 214 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 1998). See also
Smith, Emandpation at 17, 51, 137, 139, 194, 216 (cited in note 4); Segal, Blacks in the Law at 224 (cited in
note 3).
17. Crockett, 19 Wayne L Rev at 62-63 (cited in note 1).
Judidaty:The Inflkience ofRace andGender on Jmging 28 U Rich
18. Susan Moloney Smith, Diversoingtbe
L Rev 179, 204 (1994). See also Keith Watters, Beboldtbe Dream, 10 Natl Bar Assn Mag 1 (1996).
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of our judges are elected to office in popularity contests and so many even of
those who are appointed are selected with political considerations in mind, professional competence cannot be taken for granted and hence considerable atten9
tion is devoted here to the need of professional training and experience."'
During the Civil Rights Era, blacks' nascent social equality presented opportunities for political activism, recognition, and alliances, such that strategic political relationships would become as beneficial to blacks seeking judicial office
as they had traditionally been for whites. "My two and a half years in the political arena," writes Judge Constance Motley, "greatly broadened my knowledge
about the operations of the New York State legislature and of New York City,
knowledge that has proved invaluable during my judgeship ....I learned firsthand about New York's power groups and how they operate, sometimes together and sometimes not, to achieve political goals. There is no substitute for
first-hand experience in the legislative and executive branches of government." 20
Black political activists and judicial hopefuls alike began to deploy the tools
of political patronage to influence judicial selection, as well as other sociopolitical appointment and election outcomes. "[I]he participation in politics by
the black lawyer was seen as an avenue of power, as a way to influence the court
system in the same way the white folks did. Since judges were elected, and since
elections were controlled through the political party machinery... black lawyers
became active in the party of their choosing in order to influence elections and
to benefit from them." 2' Consequently, African Americans made important
progress in the political arena during the 1960s and 1970s, and that progress
helped to spur significant increases in the number of black judges. With respect
to the federal bench, the number of black judges began to move beyond that of
periodic, token appointments.2 And with the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976,
the federal judiciary witnessed the appointment of an unprecedented number of
black judges to its ranks. 23 "The Carter Administration ... carried out a concerted effort to 'balance' the federal bench through increased appointments of
minorities and women. The insertion of an additional criterion for judicial selection, a demonstrated 'commitment to equal justice under the law,' expanded the
24
pool of eligible applicants to include more women and minorities."
But while the political activism and social progress that helped open the

19.

Vanderbilt, 36 BU L Rev at 28 (cited in note 7).

20. Motley, EqualJustice Under Law at 215 (cited in note 16); Smith, Emancpation at 17 (cited in note
4). See also Pitts and Vinson, 2 Harv BlackLetter LJ at 30 (cited in note 5).
21. Smith, Ensandpadonat 17 (cited in note 4).
22. Motley, EqualJustice
Under Lan at 214 (cited in note 16).
23. Moloney Smith, 28 U Rich L Rev at 181 (cited in note 18) ("Of his 258 nominations, Carter
nominated 40 (15.5%) women and 55 (21.3%) minorities. During his term, 38 (14.7%) black judges were
appointed."). See also Segal, Blacks in the Law at 229 (cited in note 3).
24. Pitts and Vinson, 2 Harv BlackLetter LJ at 39 (cited in note 5). Indeed, blacks enjoyed similar
progress in the state courts during this period. See Segal, Blacks in the Law at 229 (cited in note 3).
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doors to the judiciary would continue beyond the 1970s,2 African American
ascension onto the bench did not keep pace 2 6 The executive initiative to include
27
blacks within the federal judiciary evaporated once President Carter left office.
And in the state courts, the momentum of the Civil Rights Movement dissipated
as an atmosphere of anti-affirmative action and racial backlash took hold of the
nation:
Despite dramatic gains in the legislative arena in the past 20 years, racial diversity
on state courts remains a much lauded but seemingly elusive goal. Only 3.8% of al
state court judges are African American .... In jurisdictions with large African

American populations, the figures are disturbingly similar. In New York State for
example, only 6.3% of the state's judges were African American in 1991, although
African Americans constituted 14.3% of the state's population. In Georgia, where
27% of the population is African American, only 6% of the state's judges are African American. These figures stand in stark contrast to the gains made by minorities in state legislatures. Those gains-directly attributable to the Voting Rights

Act's removal of the structural impediments to meaningful28electoral participation

by minority voters-have not been mirrored in judicial fora.

POTHOLES IN THE ROAD IN THE POST-CIVL RIGHTS ERA
One cause for blacks' diminishing gains in the judiciary may rest with the
inability of African American lawyers to buttress the post-Civil Rights Era political advancement with acceptance in certain pertinent professional tiers in
corporate America. Even throughout the Civil Rights heyday, the major corporate law firms and in-house counsel departments failed to open their doors to
black lawyers. 29 Thus, black judicial hopefuls, though better positioned than in
25. See generally Harold A. McDougall, Black Baltimore:A New Theoy of Communi v (Temple 1993);
David K. Shipler, A Country of Strangers16 (Alfred A. Knopf 1997) ("In 1992... the number of blacks in
Congress jumped from 26 to 39, and then to 41, the highest in history ....
Between 1970 and 1993, blacks
holding elected positions at the federal, state, and local levels went from 1,469 to 8,015. The number of
black state legislators rose from 307 in 1979 to 511 in 1993 ...and mayors [went] from 48 in 1970 to 338
in 1993.).
26. Elizabeth Chambliss, American Bar Association Commission on Racial and Ethnic Diversity in
the Profession, Miles to Go 2000: Progressof Minoritiesin the Legal Profession 16 ('The ABA Directory of Minoriy
Juges of the United States places minority representation among all judges (including federal, state, and
administrative judges, [etc.]) at 6.0 percent in 1997 [including] 2.8 percent African American").
27. Moloney Smith, 28 U Rich L Rev at 182 (cited in note 18) ("out of President Reagan's 379 appointments, 31 (8.2%) were women and 7 (1.8%) were black. President Bush appointed more than 200
judges, and only 13 were black."); Steven Keeva, Slow Integration, Dec-78 ABAJ 28 (1992); Nancy B. Broff
and Nan AronJudgeshbo, Made Eay, NY Tmes 35 (Apr 18, 1986).
28. Ifill, 39 BC L Rev at 95-96 (cited in note 2); Moloney Smith, 28 U Rich L Rev at 180-81 (cited
in note 18) ("In 1991, the total number of black judges was 895. Of these, 822 serve on state courts, representing an increase of 14% from 1986. At the federal level there has actually been a decrease in the number
of black judges, from 99 in 1986 to 73 in 1991.).
29. David B. Wilkins and G. Mitu Gulati, Iby Are There So Few Black Lanyer in CorporateLaw Firms?
An InstitutionalAnajysis, 84 Cal L Rev 493, 496 (1996) ("Although the number of black students graduating

146

Roundtable

[8:135

the pre-Civil Rights Era, continue to lack a significant piece of artillery in the
campaign for judicial office.
Many commentators contend that the reason for the lack of African American ingress into the elite corporate ranks is the same reason many black lawyers,
including even those who possess both the political and professional prerequisites, are unable to advance within the judiciary. The cause proffered is simple
racial bias, whether in connection with the recruitment and selection of candidates or with respect to mentoring and other professional development opportunities.30
On the other hand, there are those commentators who argue to the contrary. They insist that racial animus has little or nothing to do with either the low
numbers of blacks on the bench or the disproportionately small number of African Americans occupying other positions in the upper echelons of the legal
profession overall. They cite a variety of alternative economic, political, and
even educational or vocational explanations, not the least of which are that current discrimination remedies are inefficient and heavy-handed and that some
blacks impede their own progress31by being overly "race sensitive" or resistant to
constructive advice and criticism.
While these opposing views perhaps reflect more oversimplification than
indisputable fact or outright inaccuracy, the overall lack of African American
progress at these upper ranks, especially when compared with the advances
made by many other previously disenfranchised groups, does make the likelihood of at least some kind or degree of racial bias difficult to discount. 32 Nonefrom law schools has increased significantly in the recent decades, blacks still make up a very small minority of the lawyers working in large corporate law firms"); Lateef Mtima, African-American Empowemlent
Strategies for the New Millenium--Rvisifing the IWashing/on-Du Bois Dialectic, 42 Howard L J 391, 405 (1999);
Pearce, 42 Howard LJ at 60 (cited in note 2); Pitts and Vinson, 2 Harv BlackLetter LJ at 31 (cited in note
5).
30. Christopher McKnight, Does Radsm Keep the 4th Circuit Inco plete?, at http://-ww.law.com (visited July 31, 2000) ("The Republican-controlled Senate has been holding up confirmation of minority
nominees for four vacancies on the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, demonstrating racist and sexist
tendencies, according to the Congressional Black Caucus .... As of last November, the Senate had confirmed 42 percent of Clinton's white nominees, but less than 18 percent of his black nominees. Representative Mel Watt, D-N.C., attributes the difference to race. 'Race is a major factor in the Senate process of
confirmation of nominees ... and race is still a very large issue in America."). See also Terry Carter, Divided Justice, Feb-85 ABA J 42 (1999).
31. See Carter, Feb-85 ABA J 42 (cited in note 30). See also Joan Biskupic, Politics Snare Court Hopes
of Minoities and IWomen, USA Today 1A, 11A (Aug 22, 2000) ("No nominee is being denied the chance to
serve as a federal judge because of his or her race or gender,' ... says [Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch. And according to] Sen. Jeff Sessions.. . 'The idea that there has been some obstruction
of Clinton's nominees is ludicrous. If there's any bias regarding minorities, it's a reluctance to oppose").
32. See Watters, 10 NatI Bar Assn Mag at 1 (cited in note 18) ("Despite all of the rhetoric about affirmative action, the percentage of black judges and lawyers has remained unchanged for the past 30
years .... Black judges and lawyers remained at a paltry 2.7 percent of all judges and lawyers for decades .... White females on the other hand, greatly expanded their ranks of attorneys and judges, going
from 16 percent to 23 percent during the past decade. It is a sad commentary that affirmative action has
been a substantial benefit to white females, but has just barely enabled our numbers from falling even
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theless, the likelihood of some racial inequity does not inevitably lead to the
conclusion that rank racial bigotry remains rampant within these segments of
American society. Instead of outright, consciously racist views, it may be that
subconsdous or subl'minal racial attitudes infect the relevant evaluation and selection processes, and do so in ways that facially race-neutral evaluation mechanisms are ill equipped to counteract.
Consequently, protective mechanisms that presuppose the absence of significant racial bias in the relevant appointment and selection process, and do so
principally because the law explicitly states that racial discrimination is no longer
permitted to affect such decisions, are likely to prove less than wholly effective
where such bias manifests itself in forms that register "below the radar" of the
checks and balances inherent in the process. Indeed, in some situations, appointment and selection processes constructed or assessed without considering
race, or perhaps more pointedly, without considering radsm, can affirmatively
engender racial inequities predsey because they fail to account for the fact that
such attitudes continue to influence subjective evaluations-notwithstanding the
express, post-Civil Rights Era directives that such notions are anathema to merit
assessment in an enlightened society.
An examination of African American participation and progress in connection with prevailing state and federal judicial selection processes helps to delineate the problem. In general, facially "race-neutral" selection procedures notwithstanding, the more subjective evaluation mechanisms disproportionately disfavor African American candidates. And while the cause for this imbalance may
not be a reemergence of outright racist views, it appears that racial bias in some
form is an important explanatory factor.
IN A NEW YORK STATE OF MIND: RACIAL BIAS AND THE
JUDICIAL SELECTION OF STATE JUDGES
At the state level, judges are typically both elected and appointed. 33 And
while the precise application and combination of these mechanisms naturally
varies from state to state, judicial selection procedures are generally composed
of both "objective" and "subjective" evaluation avenues and criteria.
The New York State judicial selection process provides a concrete opportunity to compare objective with subjective judicial selection pathways toward
discerning how covert and subliminal racial bias may affect outcomes under
otherwise "neutral" selection procedures. Though race neutral on its face, there
is little dispute that New York's "dual-track" judicial appointment system, de-

further behind."); Debra Cassens, Snapshot ofProgress, Apr-86 ABAJ 100 (2000) ('Today, women head nine
of 28 [ABA] sections and divisions .... Since 1987, 37 percent of all law graduates have been women").
See also text accompanying note 80.
33. See generally Dunn, 4 Hofstra L Rev 267 (cited in note 1).
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scribed above, has shortchanged that state's black and other racial minorities.
Although elected judges outnumber appointed ones in most parts of New York
state, in New York City, where racial minorities comprise a majority of the resident population, slightly more than half the judges have been appointed as opposed to elected. And there is no question that the New York appointment
mechanism has disproportionately favored whites. "Of the 146 [appointed] justices assigned to the city, only 10% are African-American, Hispanic or Asian,
the city's regular 152 elected justices, 35% are from minority
while among
34
groups."
To be fair, the genesis of the New York problem is the fact that the state
constitution limits the number of judgeships to one for every fifty thousand
residents.35 Because of its higher crime rate, however, New York City has a
denser caseload than other cities in the state and therefore requires more judges.
Instead of moving to amend the state constitution to address New York City's
unique needs, for the past thirty years the state legislature has co-opted the
"temporary" appointment procedure, which was initially instituted in the 197 0s
to stem the overflow of new drug cases arising under the Rockefeller drug
laws.

36

Given its origins, it can certainly be argued that, albeit inequitable in application, the temporary appointment system was not intended as a racially biased
procedure. However, once the New York legislature granted the governor the
power to fill these "temporary" judgeships, they inevitably became political
plums to be doled out in gratitude for political patronage. 37 To the extent that
blacks have not benefited from these opportunities, however, their exclusion

34. Juan Gonzalez, City's Jeny BuiltJustice, NY Daily News 8 jan 12, 2000). See also Use of Acting
Supreme CourtJudges Is Cballengedby CapitalDefendant, NY Law Journal 25 (May 12, 1998).
35. NY Const Art 6 § 6.
36. In 1973, then Governor Nelson Rockefeller pushed through the legislature new "get tough"
drug legislation, which increased criminal penalties and limited plea bargaining options in connection with
drug offenses. In response to critics' concerns that the stiffer penalties would overload the courts with
hundreds of additional cases, the Governor proposed that he use his authority to appoint additional judges
to the New York Court of Claims, and these additional judges could then be "temporarily" assigned to the
state trial courts. See Robert Hermann, History ofa Mess: The !AcjtingJustices',New York LJ 2 (Dec 20, 1994).
See also E.R. Shipp, Must New York Bend the Law to Make the Courts Work?, NY Times § 4, 6 (Feb 7, 1982).
37. Evan Haynes, The Selection and Tenure ofJudges 97-98 (National Conference of Judicial Councils
1944). See also Vanderbilt, 36 BU L Rev at 36 (cited in note 7) ("Many states adopted provisions for filling
judicial office by popular election; the 'mode of selection by legislature or by the governor and the legislature was widely condemned as introducing the evils of party politics into judicial appointments. It was
openly asserted that judicial places were to become the spoils of partisan conflict and selections were made
not on account of ability and fitness but as rewards for political service."); John Gibeaut, Bench Battle, Aug86 ABA J 42, 43 (2000) ("Although 31 state constitutions still envision trial judges facing opponents in
contested elections, in some of those states more than half the judges actually reach the bench via appointment by the governor after a judge retires midterm, according to a study by the American Judicature
Society. When election time rolls around, challenges to appointed incumbents are almost as rare as snow in
subtropical Manatee County [Florida]. 'It's a huge patronage scam .... It always has been and always will
be as long as that system exists."'); Dunn, 4 Hofstra L Rev at 298-301 (cited in note 1).
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was never the express objective of this "racially neutral" judicial balancing
mechanism.
Even accepting that the laudable approach of judicial appointment by
"merie must pragmatically encompass appointments for patronage,3 the tremendous racial disparities revealed in comparing the respective racial make-ups
of New York's appointed and elected 39judiciaries render the separate allegation of
racial bias a difficult one to repudiate:
The 25-year-old practice of appointing acting justices to the Supreme Court is virtually a whites-only promotion system .... Manhattan and the Bronx, the two judiidal districts with the state's highest percentage of minority residents, are the only
ones in the state where the appointed justices outnumber the elected .... In both
boroughs, whites form a disproportionately higher share of the appointed justices.
In the Bronx [with a 93.6% minority population] 45% of elected justices are from
minority groups, compared with 8% of appointed ones. In Manhattan [with a
65.5% minority population] minorities comprise 28% of the elected but only 9%
of the acting justices.4

In the words of one veteran Hispanic New York judge, if the appointments
have anything at all to do with merit, "[t]he merit system 'seems to find 'merit'
only with white men.'" 41 And additional evidence suggests that the racial inequities that appear to result from this kind of subjective merit assessment should
not be discounted as the provincial idiosyncrasy of an isolated, antediluvian
state.

RACIAL BIAS AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS:
ACCIDENTALLY ON PURPOSE?
On the one hand, the overall percentage of black federal judges is more racially representative than the corresponding numbers in the state judiciary. On
38.

See David Adamany and Philip Du Bois, Eleefing State Judges, 1976 Wis L Rev 731, 765-67

(1976).
39. While it is possible that the racial disparities might also be attributed to a lack of "political
savvy" on the part of black judicial aspirants, the relevant indicia tend to suggest otherwise. First, even the
most jaded political analyst must concede that judicial appointments are at least sometimes based principally on merit In such instances the element of political patronage is de-emphasized and some competent,
albeit "unsavvy," blacks could be appointed. But more to the point, the growing success of African Ameri-

cans in obtaining political office in New York and other states suggests an inreang political dexterity,
which necessarily encompasses a greater appreciation for the role of political patronage in obtaining or
conferring appointments.
40. Juan Gonzalez, A Supreme Exavole ofEthnicBias, NY Daily News 8 (Jan 14, 2000).
41. Id. See Margaret Y.K. Woo, Reaffirming Medt in Affirmative Acton, 47 J Legal Educ 514, 517-18
(1997). For similar criticisms of the judicial election process, see Ifill, 39 BC L Rev 95 (cited in note 2). The
exclusion of blacks from the major corporate law firms exacerbates the problem; foreclosed from the
professional environments in which the "power brokers" do business, black attorneys' chances to become
professionally intimate with those who make or influence such appointments are even further diminished.
See Dunn, 4 Hofstra L Rev at 298-99, 302 (cited in note 1).
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the other hand, the federal selection process is a highly subjective one in that all
federal judges are appointed and there are no elected seats on the federal bench.
And when the experiences of black judicial candidates are compared with that of
white nominees, race does seem to continue to play a determinative role in the
federal judicial selection process.
While President Clinton tried to pick up where the Carter Administration
left off in nominating blacks to the federal bench,42 black nominees appear to
run a different gauntlet than that faced by white nominees. Although all the
Clinton nominees were obviously submitted for consideration by a Democratic
administration to a Republican-dominated Congress, nominees who were white,
especially white males, moved through the confirmation process faster and, indeed, were more likely to be confirmed than nominees who were black. The
bipartisan Constitution Project found that the rejection rate for white nominees
was half that for minority nominees. 4 3 As of the end of 1997, 87 percent of the
Clinton nominees who had been waiting the longest for confirmation were minorities and women, while the fastest confirmations were those of white men.44
"The nominees who are female or minority have had the worst time of it. Of the
10 nominees who have been waiting a year or more for confirmation, seven are
female or minority. The 11 judges who have managed to be confirmed in 1999
include eight white men. 45
The nomination of African American district court judge James A. Beaty,
Jr., to fill a vacancy on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
provides a tableau of disparate treatment endured by a black judicial nominee.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had no black judges when Judge Beaty was
first nominated by President Clinton in 1995, and the situation had not improved when he was again nominated in 1997. While awaiting his confirmation
hearing, however, two more seats opened on the very same court, and white
candidates were subsequently nominated to fill them. Judge Beaty watched as
42. See generally Carl Tobias, Fostering Balance on the Federal Courts, 47 Am U L Rev 935, 942, 950
(1998) ("the Clinton Administration compiled an excellent record of judicial selection during its initial year.
President Clinton enjoyed great success in naming and nominating exceptionally talented women and
minorities, eclipsing the Reagan Administration's efforts and easily outdistancing those of Presidents Bush
and Carter. The Clinton Administration espoused clear objectives for appointing judges and instituted
effective selection practices, especially for identifying and nominating very competent female and minority
attorneys ....The President named 198 lawyers to the federal courts; sixty (thirty percent) of those judges
are women and fifty-five (twenty-eight percent) are minorities. This record is unparalleled."); Chambliss,
Miles to Go 2000 at 14 (cited in note 26) ("President Clinton has appointed more African Americans to the
federal bench (57) than the last three Presidents combined... and with higher ABA approval ratings.').
43. Debra Baker, Waiting and Wondering, 85 ABA J 52, 52 (1999); Playing Politics with JudicalAppointments, The Record L11 (Oct 14, 1999); Chambliss, Miles to Go 2000 at 15 (cited in note 26).
44. Baker, 85 ABA J at 53 (cited in note 43).
45. Where Are the Judges?Ask the U.S. Senate, The Tennessean 12A (Aug 21, 1999). See also Biskupic,
USA Today at 1A (cited in note 31) ("A review of Clinton's nominees reveals that though he has diversified the bench more than any other president, the nomination process ... has become a political meat
grinder, especially for African-Americans, Hispanics and women... 35% of Clinton's minority nominees
have not been confirmed by the Senate, compared with a 14% failure rate among whites').
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these candidates not only proceeded to their confirmation hearings but also had
their nominations confirmed, while he continued to wait for his own confirmation hearing. That hearing never came.46
As for the all white bench of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit? It
is perhaps of some notable irony that the Fourth Circuit has been described as
"the only circuit court in the Deep South having no African-American representation on its judiciary [yet it] has the largest African-American population of any
circuit... except for the District of Columbia Circuit." 47 And the condition
does not appear to be an accidental one. "For the past seven years, the Clinton
Administration has tried to appoint a black jurist to the all-white U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, but not one of his nominees has been given
even a hearing in the Senate, notwithstanding the fact that there are four vacandes on the 15-member court. ' 4s Indeed, the court's Chief Judge, J. Harvie Wilkinson, has been credited with saying that the court does not need any more
judges and that it would "lose a sense of collegiality if it grew too large. ' 49
Nonetheless, some staunch defenders of the confirmation process still contend that "[r]ace probably has less to do -with [the treatment of black judicial
nominees] than the fact that minority candidates are more likely to hold views at
odds with Republican senators."5' But it is difficult to grasp the basis for the
implication that white Democrats have views more like those of white Republicans than like those of black Democrats. Given that all of the nominees were
proposed by the same Democratic administration, just what exactly is it that
white Republican senators find compatible in the views of white Democrats that
they are unable to discern in the Democrats "of a different color"?
SUBLIMINAL RACIAL BIAS IN SELECTION AND APPOINTMENT TO
THE JUDICIARY
Mickey Edwards, a former Oklahoma congressman, Harvard professor, and
co-chairman of Citizens for Independent Courts has said:
It does seem to me that there is a problem. Being a Republican and knowing some
46. Baker, 85 ABAJ at 53 (cited in note 43).
47.

Id. Indeed, the concerns raised by Judge Beaty's situation have been voiced in connection with

the treatment of many other black nominees. See, for example, David Goldstein, Black LaigersAsk Clinton
to Bjpass Senate, Appoint 6, The Houston Chronicle 14 (Nov 13, 1999) (suggesting that the rejection of
Missouri Supreme Court Judge Ronnie White for a federal judgeship stirred even more controversy,
prompting the Congressional Black Caucus to express to President Clinton "profound doubts about fair
and unbiased treatment" for black and other minority nominees).
48. David G. Savage, ClintonLosing FigbtforBlackJudge, LA Times Al (uly 7, 2000). See also Chainbliss, Miles to Go 2000 at 15 (cited in note 26) ("Senator Jesse Helms ... has blocked the confirmation of
three consecutive African American nominees, despite the fact that the seat has been vacant since 1994 and
has been designated a judicial emergency.').
49. See Savage, LA Tunes at Al (cited in note 48).
50. Baker, 85 ABAJ at 53 (cited in note 43).
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of these people in Congress. it's hard for me to argue there is racism involved. But
it demands an explanation.

The disproportionately low number of black judges and, indeed, the apparent
exclusion of black lawyers from many other positions of authority and prestige
in the legal profession inevitably implicate the question of racial bias in the attendant selection and appointment processes. Although race has been extirpated
from virtually all express qualification criteria in the United States, common
sense and experience suggest that it is "implausible that racist attitudes, so widespread in contemporary society, should be significantly absent from the world of
work where predominantly white employers, supervisors, and union officials
decide whether blacks should be rewarded equally with whites. 52
One consequence of the Civil Rights Era that complicates the issue of racial
bias in various selection and evaluation processes has been the displacement of
overt racial bigotry in favor of covert stereotypical opinions about blacks. "What
has changed in recent years is the way people speak in public. Indeed, even in
private conversations, the coarser kinds of descriptions are less often heard.

[This is especially true with respect to the highly educated professionals, in] that
the choice to go on with formal learning usually reflects a wish to raise oneself
socially and professionally, which in turn calls for more caution in speech and
53
demeanor."

Even when there are no blacks within earshot, it can be difficult to get some
non-blacks to speak frankly about their feelings toward black people, especially
with regard to the question of blacks' abilities or qualifications to fulfill certain
roles in American society. "In an unusually candid summary of the attitude
among many white lawyers toward black associates, one [corporate law firm]
partner [said], 'Anyone who spends any time in the profession would know
there are lots of minorities, African-Americans especially, who are running
around with Harvard and Yale degrees who are not qualified in any sense. They

51.
See Biskupic, USA Today at 11A (cited in note 31).
52. Gertrude Ezorsky, Racism &Justice 14 (Cornell 1991); Annie Murphy Paul, Where Bias Begins: The
Truth About Stereo~pes, 31 Psychol Today 52, 55 (1998) ("'Children don't have a choice about accepting or
rejecting these conceptions, since they're acquired well before they have the cognitive abilities or experiences to form their own beliefs.' And no matter how progressive the parents, they must compete with all
the forces that would promote and perpetuate these stereotypes: peer pressure, mass media, the actual
balance of power in society."). See generally Cynthia R. Mabry, "Love Is Not Enough!" In TransradalAdop.
tions-Scrutiiing Recent Statutes, Ageng , Polices, And Prospective Adoptive Parents,42 Wayne L Rev 1347 (1996).
For an argument that such prejudices are indigenous to certain fundamental, religious-expansionist
underpinnings of American society, see Michael DeHaven Newsom, The American Protestant Empire: A
Historical Perspective, 40 Washburn L J 187, 188-89, 243 (2001) ("Chattel slavery might appear at first to be
an example of colonial exceptionalism. However, both [Anglican] Dissenters and Anglicans participated in
the building of the 'peculiar institution,' making it a pan-Protestant undertaking. Chattel slavery also stands
as a wretched example of the idea of 'perpetual reformation mandated by the social covenant.").
53. Andrew Hacker, Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal52 (Scribner 1992); Maurice E.R. Munroe, Unamerican Tail Of Segregation and MulticulturalEducation, 64 Albany L Rev 241 (2000).
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have been solicited and tutored and polished up and sent out to the profession
and they're not up to grade, for whatever reason.' This is not an unusual opinion
54
among white lawyers at... elite firms, merely one that is rarely articulated."
The fact that there are few bigots today blatantly swaggering about polite
professional society has, for some, genuinely clouded the picture as to the extent
to which racial prejudice against blacks remains a professional or, for that matter, even a social reality.55 The post-Civil Rights etiquette that necessitates the

camouflaging of certain racial views not only conceals affirmative prejudice but
also makes it difficult for some non-bigots to appreciate or even acknowledge
the existence of covert or reflexive and subconscious racial biases. Nonetheless,
despite society's newfound impatience with outright racial epithets, there remain
sufficient indicia that some basic, underlying apprehensions about blacks have
not all together disappeared:
[A]s much as anything else, being 'black' in America bears the mark of slavery.
Even after emancipation... the ideology that had provided the rationale for slavery by no means disappeared ....Immigrants only hours off the boat, while subjected to scorn, were-and still are--allowed to assert their superiority to black
Americans. And in our own time, must it be admitted at the close of the twentieth
century that residues of slavery continue to exist? The answer is obviously yes. The
fact that blacks are separated more severely than any other group conveys that
message. Indeed, the fear persists that
if allowed to come closer, they will some56
how contaminate the rest of society.

The fact that it is no longer considered appropriate to express openly racial
54. Paul M. Barrett, The GoodBlack 55 (Dutton 1999). See also Shipler, A County of Strangers at 28485 (cited in note 25).
55. Kevin Sack and Janet Elder, PollFindsOptimistic Outlook But Enduring RadalDiviion,NY Times 1
(July 11, 2000) ("Thirty-five years after the dismantling of legalized segregation . . .blacks and whites
continue to have starkly divergent perceptions of many racial issues and they remain largely isolated from
each other in their everyday lives .... On many questions, particularly those related to whether blacks are
treated equitably and whether race plays too large a role in the national discourse, blacks and whites seemed
to be living on different planets. Blacks were roughly four times more likely than whites to say that they
thought blacks were treated less fairly in the workplace, in neighborhood shops, in shopping malls and in
restaurants, theaters, bars and other entertainment venues.").
56. Hacker, Two Nationsat 15-16 (cited in note 53); Lisa Crooms, Speaking PartialTruths andPreserving
Poweir Deconstructng White Suprema, Patriarchy, and the Rape CorroborationRule in the Interest of Liberation, 40
Howard LJ 459, 474-90 (Winter 1997); Shipler, A Countg of Strangersat 9 (cited in note 25) ("neither deference nor defiance has been effective for black Americans as a whole. No degree of personal success quite
erases the stigma of black skin, as many achieving blacks realize when they step outside their family,
neighborhood, or professional environment into a setting where their rank and station and accomplishments are not known.'); Mabry, 42 Wayne L Rev at 1399-1402 (cited in note 52) ("African Americans'
accomplishments do not shield them from racism. Despite affirmative efforts by United States Presidents,
Congress, individual citizens, and the courts to eliminate discrimination, society is as color-struck as
ever ....Race matters in employment .... Race matters in the criminal justice system ....Race even
matters in cities where the population of African Americans is substantial... it is possible that 'one day...
children will not be judged by the color of their skin, but by the content of their character.' However, that
day is neither today nor tomorrow.").
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intolerance may not only drive these opinions "underground," but it may sometimes contort these views or reactions into a more unconscious, subliminal abscess:
Social behavior is ordinarily treated as being under conscious (if not always
thoughtful) control. However, considerable evidence now supports the view that
social behavior often operates in an implicit or unconscious fashion. The identifying feature of implicit cognition is that past experience influences judgment in a
The theorized ordinariness of
fashion not introspectively known by the actor ....
implicit stereotyping is consistent57with recent findings of discrimination by people
who explicitly disavow prejudice.

Recently, scholars of psychology, sociology, and law have contributed significantly to the broadening discourse on subliminal racial bias against blacks
and others in post-Civil Rights America. 58 While most commentators agree that
neither the precise nature and extent of subliminal racial prejudice in American
society nor, for that matter, definitive methods of detecting, assessing, and addressing such bias have been discerned, the effects of prejudice on routine reactions toward blacks are nonetheless concrete. 59 Moreover, while subliminal racial
Social Cognition: Attitudes, Sef-Esteem, and
57. Anthony G. Greenwald and Mahzarin R. Banaji, It*pidit
Stereotipes, 102 Psychol Rev 4, 4-27 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego and Equal Protection:

Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan L Rev 317, 330, 335 (1987) ("racism in America is much more
complex than either the conscious conspiracy of a power elite or the simple delusion of a few ignorant
bigots. It is a part of our common historical experience and, therefore, a part of our culture. It arises from

the assumptions we have learned to make about the world, ourselves, and others as well as from the patterns of our fundamental social activities ....But how is the unconscious involved when racial prejudice is
less apparent-when racial bias is hidden from the prejudiced individual as well as from others? Increasingly, as our culture has rejected racism as immoral and unproductive, this hidden prejudice has become
the more prevalent form of racism."); Mtima, 42 Howard LJ at 418 (cited in note 29) ("The success of the
Civil Rights Movement is that most white Americans no longer have to be persuaded that blacks are human beings, or that racial discrimination is morally wrong. Nonetheless, certain stubborn, racially reflexive
fears and perceptions persist, which prevent many whites from regarding or interacting with blacks fully as
equals, especially in highly subjective or intimate situations.'); Shipler, A Country of Strangers at 5 (cited in
note 25).
58. See generally Greenwald and Banaji, 102 Psychol Rev 4 (cited in note 57); Lawrence, 39 Stan L
Rev 317 (cited in note 57); Murphy Paul, 31 Psychol Today 52 (cited in note 52); e. christi cunningham,
Preserving Normal Heterosexual Male Fantasy: The "Severe or Pervasive" Missed Interpretation of Sexual Harassment in
the Absence of a Tangible Job Consequence, 1999 U Chi Legal F 199 (1999). See also Jody David Armour, Negmphobia and Reasonable Racism 68-80 (New York University 1997); Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 Tulane L Rev 1065, 1070-71 (1998).
59. Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a .Qualled Evidenliagy
Equal Employment Opportunio Privilege, 74 Wash L Rev 913, 915 (1999) ("empirical psychology studies...
show that intentional, conscious discrimination is only a small fraction of workplace discrimination and
that most discriminatory acts result from unconscious stereotyping and cultural bias that never enter into
the decision maker's conscious mind-hence the outrage felt by defendants when accused of intentional

discrimination."); Murphy Paul, 31 Psychol Today at 82 (cited in note 52) ("We can't claim that we've
eradicated prejudice just because its outright expression has waned. What's more, the strategies that were

so effective in reducing that sort of bias won't work on unconscious beliefs ....Exhortation, education,
political protest-all of these hammer away at our conscious beliefs while the bedrock below remains

untouched.").
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bias may hamper blacks in a variety of social and vocational contexts, its effects
are likely to be most pernicious in those situations in which highly subjective
assessments and decisions are generally made, such as selection and appointment to the judiciary, promotion to corporate law firm partnership, and similar
"upper level" employment decisions. "[U]pper level employment decisions are
likely to turn on subjective, discretionary assessments of intangible qualities like
'judgment,' 'leadership,' 'initiative,' and 'sensitivity.' In contrast, standards for
often can be objectified and the requihiring and promotion in lower level jobs
' 60
site job skills articulated and measured.
It does not take rocket science to perceive how highly subjective criteria can
be deployed unfairly to exclude blacks from influential or privileged positions,
even in the absence of any affirmative or conscious prejudice against blacks.
'Discrimination may... arise from stereotyped characterizations of a profession
or job, rather than of a particular... group. Employers in a profession that has
traditionally been white and male may unknowingly gauge female and minority
group applicants against the stereotype, and conclude that they lack the intangible qualities indicative of professional aptitude and competence. The public view
of the profession as white and male reinforce[s this] attitude. ' 61 Indeed, even
where decisionmakers have been specifically admonished not to mistake qualities or characteristics that are generally associated with groups who have traditionally dominated a certain profession for qualities or characteristics that are
aaualy essential or relevant to successful performance in that profession, these
express admonitions and directives don't always reach subconscious mores and
assumptions:
MIlhe lesson [of racial prejudice] is not explicit It is learned, internalized, and used

without an awareness of its source. Thus, an individual may select a white job applicant over an equally qualified black and honestly believe that this decision was
based on observed intangibles unrelated to race. The employer perceives the white
candidate as 'more articulate,' 'more collegial,' 'more thoughtful,' or 'more charismatic.' He is unaware of the learned stereotype that influenced his decision. Moreover, he has probably also learned an explicit lesson of which he is very much

aware: Good, law-abiding people do not judge others on the basis of race. Even
will not uncover the racethe most thorough investigation of conscious motive
62
based stereotype that has influenced his decision.

Some recent studies in connection with subliminal racial bias have shed further light on its probable effects on the overall status of blacks in America.
60. Judith Bartnoff, Title VII and Empiyment Disciminaion in 'Upper Level" Jobs, 73 Colum L Rev
1614 (1973).
61. Id at 1629; Lawrence, 39 Stan L Rev at 317-18 (cited in note 57).
62. Lawrence, 39 Stan L Rev at 343 (cited in note 57). See also Greenwald and Banaji, 102 Psychol
Rev at 20 (cited in note 57) (citing studies showing that "White interviewers maintained greater physical
distance, demonstrated less eye contact, and administered shorter interviews when interacting with Black
(as opposed to White) interviewees.").
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Some of the more interesting revelations concern the relationship between such
reflexive racial bias on the one hand and conscious intellectual beliefs about
blacks on the other.
For example, in 1995, Professors Mahzarin R. Banaji and Anthony G.
Greenwald devised the Implicit Association Test (the "IAT ' ) as one means by
63
which to gauge subliminal social biases in connection with such issues as race.
In essence, the test consists of showing the test taker a picture of a white person
and a picture of a black person, to which the labels "good" or "bad" are alternately affixed. 64 The test taker is then asked to match rapidly the picture labeled
"good" with various positive images and ideas flashed before her, and to match
rapidly the picture labeled "bad" with various negative images and ideas. The
test taker's biases or predilections are revealed if she is able to match more easily
the appropriate picture with the corresponding images and ideas whenever a
certain picture is given the "good" or "bad" label. Thus, for example, a person
who can quickly make accurate matches when the picture labeled "good" is that
of a black person but then makes many matching mistakes when the "bad" label
is given to the picture of the black person is revealed to have an unconscious
preference for thinking of blacks as "good" and an unconscious resistance to
65
associating blacks with things that are considered "bad.,
Among the various findings and conclusions derived from the results of
random application of the IAT, perhaps one of the most interesting is that a
number of genuinely liberal whites who took the test discovered that, notwithstanding their sincere beliefs in racial equality, they still harbor subconscious
preferences for whites.66 The IAT revelation that is perhaps the most sobering,
however, is that a number of blacks who took the test discovered that they also
67
harbor subliminal predilections in favor of white people.
63. See Anthony G. Greenwald, et al, Measuring Individual Differences in Implidt Cognition: The Implidt
Association Test, 74 J Personality & Social Psychol 1464, 1464-80 (1998). Professors Greenwald and Banaji
are among the leading researchers in this area, and their IAT and attendant findings have been widely
disseminated. The IAT can be self-administered at http://www.yale.edu/implicit, where additional information about the IAT and its use and application can be obtained.
64. Greenwald, et al, 74J Personality & Social Psychol at 1473 (cited in note 63).
65. Idat 1465.
66. Id at 1474-75.
67. Dateline (NBC television broadcast, Mar 19, 2000); Shipler, A County of Strangersat 278 (cited in
note 25); Anthony Paul Farley, The Black Body as Fetish Object, 76 Or L Rev 457, 480 (1997) ("On a spring
day of my eighth grade year, 1976, on a bus chartered for a class trip to Washington, D.C., one of my
school-mates stood and began to comb her long, brown hair. She was tall and cool and pretty. She combed
her long, brown hair slowly and deliberately. After a long while she turned and addressed us all, 'Whose
comb was this? Thanks, I'm all done.' No one responded. It seemed as though the unknown owner of the
comb must not have been listening. Just then, one of our class mates answered in a mirthful voice, 'It's
Farley's comb.' I, Farley, was the only black person on this otherwise all-white school trip to the nation's
capital. My classmates burst into laughter. The girl with the long brown hair turned crimson and began to
cry in loud, long sobs. The sobs quickly turned into the sounds of retching which were accompanied by
shudders running through her hunched form. She may have vomited. While her personal trauma unfolded,
accompanied by squeals of laughter from all of her white classmates, I said nothing.").
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The IAT and similar studies provide empirical support for the position that
for many Americans racial bias against blacks is today more often an unconscious and reflexive reaction, sustained even in direct confradiction to a person'sconsdous
intelkctual views
Previously, researchers who studied stereotyping had simply asked people to record their feelings about minority groups and had used their answers as an index
of their attitudes. Psychologists now understand that these conscious replies are
only half the story. How progressive a person seems to be on the surface bears littleor no relation to how prejudiced he or she is on an unconscious level .... The
'It
idea of unconscious bias does clear up some nettlesome contradictions ....
helps explain how good people can do bad things.' [B]ecause our conscious and
behavior often follows
unconscious beliefs may be very different--and because
68
enough.'
the lead of the latter--'good intentions aren't

These revelations raise some particularly troubling questions when it comes
to evaluating the progress-or lack thereof-of blacks with respect to many
elite or upper level (and therefore highly subjective) positions in society, such as
selection and appointment to the judiciary. If some Americans retain unconscious, negative reactions towards blacks in general, and at the same time they
are only comfortable with the prospect of whites holding important, authoritative positions in society, the ramifications for blacks competing for positions
such as judgeships, or as associates or partners in corporate laws firms, or any
other positions of authority and prestige, are portentous. The subjective assessments deployed in judicial and similar employment selection contexts repeatedly
require non-black decision makers to consider choosing black candidates over
white and other non-black candidates for positions traditionally occupied principally by white males. 69 Blacks seeking to occupy such roles are therefore acting
covert, and subliminal racial
in direct contravention of virtually every traditional,
70
convention that permeates American society.
To presume then that non-black evaluators of subjective qualification criteria either consciously or subconsciously disregard the race of black candidates is
at best nadve 71
68. Murphy Paul, 31 Psychol Today at 53, 55 (cited in note 52). See also Sack and Elder, NY Times
at A23 (cited in note 55) ("85 percent of whites [polled] said they did not care whether they lived in areas
where most of their neighbors were white or where most were black. But two-thirds of the whites said they
thought most white people preferred to live in white areas. And perhaps most telling, 85 percent said they
actually live in areas where they have no or few black neighbors, the same percentage that said they had no
preference.'); Pollard, 74 Wash L Rev at 917 (cited in note 59).
69. Wilkens and Gulati, 84 Cal L Rev at 521 (cited in note 29). See also Cliff Hocker, Making be
Majors, Feb-85 ABAJ 58 (1999).
70. Moloney Smith, 28 U Rich L Rev at 184 (cited in note 18) ("Probably no white male attorney
has ever been mistaken for a court reporter at a deposition, yet Muzette Hill, a black woman attorney, has
[Bilack women [attorneys] not only contrabeen so mistaken at every deposition she has ever attended, ...
dic[t] society's definition of'woman,' but society's definition of people of color as well.).
71. Barmooff, 73 Colum L Rev at 1632 (cited in note 60) ("Subjective procedures can result in dis-
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Many whites require that [their] interactions [with blacks] eschew an unacceptable level or kind of interracial intimacy ....It may be [however] that the issue of
interracial intimacy in the business context is not so much the extent of the intimacy, but [rather] how the interaction affects the ability of whites to retain a perception of a status superior to blacks ...interracial intimacy in the business context may even be desirable where it somehow reinforces, but 1',
all means does not
threaten the white client, customer, co-employee or supervisor's sense of a superior
racial status .... Lawyers [however] are almost always regarded in our society as
having a superior educational, professional and social status. As the clients of a
black attorney, whites would often be required to reveal intimate vulnerabilities or
shortcomings to a black person, who in turn would be perceived
as being in a po2
sition to judge or even look down on their white clients.

Moreover, subliminal bias is especially pernicious where subjective assessments
are made, because racial bias in this context is more likely to go undetected73
not only by third parties to the decision, but by the perpetrator herself
When racism operates at a conscious level, opposing forces can attempt to prevail
upon the rationality and moral sensibility of racism's proponents; the selfprofessed racist may even find religion on the road to Damascus and correct his
own ways. But when the discriminator is not aware of his prejudice and is convinced that he already walks in the path of righteousness, neither reason nor moral
persuasion is likely to succeed. The rocess defect is all the more intractable, and
judicial scrutiny becomes imperative.

Is there any position that African Americans may seek and attain in American society that presents a greater challenge to traditional and reflexive notions
crimination against minorities ...through the exercise of an interviewer's or grader's discretion, for employment criteria to be applied unevenly ....The interviewer or tester may not even be aware of the way
in which his judgments put women or minority candidates at a disadvantage.'). See also Lawrence, 39 Stan
L Rev at 363 (cited in note 57).
72. Mtima, 42 Howard LJ at 416-41 (cited in note 29). See also McKnight, Does Radsm Keep the 4th
Circuit Incomplete? (cited in note 30); Lawrence, 39 Stan L Rev at 372 (cited in note 57) ("whites are not
accustomed to seeing blacks in positions of authority or power. Black managers, black professors, and
black doctors are confronted with reactions ranging from disbelief to resistance to concern about their
competence. The historical exclusion of blacks from these jobs has been rationalized by a belief in their
unsuitability for these roles. What is at issue here is not just occupational stereotypes born out of habit.
These stereotypes manifest a larger and more complex ideology that has legitimized the white-over-black
authority relationship [and] the fact remains that many individuals in our culture continue to resist and
resent taking orders from blacks.").
73. Greenwald and Banaji, 102 Psychol Rev at 6 (cited in note 57) ("The empirical phenomena of
implicit social cognition involve introspectively inaccessible effects of current stimulus or prior experience
variations on judgments and decisions.., these effects often result in subjects making judgments that they
would regard as nonoptimal if made aware of the source of influence. Furthermore, these effects are likely
to occur in situations that involve economically and socially important decisions, such as hiring, educational
admissions, and personnel evaluations.").
74. Lawrence, 39 Stan L Rev at 349 (cited in note 57); Pollard, 74 Wash L Rev at 920 (cited in note
59) ("Although we may not choose to view women as intellectually incompetent sex objects or blacks as
criminals, the media bombard us with theses images, impressing stereotypes onto our cognitive processing
that likely affect our behavior.').

20011

The Road to tbe Bencb 159

of the proper place for blacks than that of a judge? How often can non-blacks
realistically be expected (subconsciously) to conclude that a black candidate is
the "better man," not only for highly competitive, elite positions but also as a
final arbiter with responsibility for and authority over non-blacks' individual and
collective fates? While indisputable social progress has been achieved since the
Civil Rights Era, many non-blacks remain consciously and subconsciously hesitant to accept African Americans filly as equals and are concomitantly apprehensive of any complete surrender to 'black" assessment, equity, judgment, or
authority:
The [race] recusal cases demonstrate the pervasiveness of what Judge [A. Leon]
Higginbotham [has] described as 'an inherent disquietude' of some white litigants
to accept African American trial judges as autonomous legal decision makers in
cases where race is at issue. By seeking the recusal of African American judges
based on the appearance of bias, these litigants suggest true impartiality can be exercised only by white male judges .... African American judges are still expected
to pass a 'race test' to prove their impartiality. Concern about the impartiality of
African American judges regularly finds expression in the judicial selection forum.
The appointment or election of African American judges is viewed with suspicion
parochial interests rather than as benefitand often seen as a response to narrow,
75
ing the judicial system as a whole.

REPAVING THE ROAD

The problem of subliminal bias against blacks is obviously one that encompasses a plethora of legal, social, and psychological issues. But insofar as its particular impact upon the racial attitudes and composition of the judiciary is concerned, perhaps one practical way of dealing with its effects may actually be to
approach the problem indirectly. If the issue is primarily one of covert and unconscious perceptions of blacks, then strategies designed to impact these perceptions, as opposed to the conditions that result from them, may have the
most beneficial-and long-lasting---effects:
[C]hildren learn lessons about race at [an early age, and] most of the lessons are
tacit rather than explicit. Children learn not so much through an intellectual understanding of what their parents tell them about race as through an emotional identification with who their parents are and what they see and feel their parents do ....
If we do learn lessons about race in this way, we are not likely to be aware that the
lessons have even taken place. If we are unaware that we have been taught to be
we may not be conafraid of blacks or to think of them as lazy or stupid, then
76
scious of our internalization of those feelings and beliefs.

75.
76.

Ifl, 39 BC L Rev at 118 (cited in note 2).
Lawrence, 39 Stan L Rev at 338 (cited in note 57); Michael Eric Dyson, Race Rules: Natgafingthe
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In this regard, increasing current efforts to bring genuine racial diversity to the
major corporate law firms could prove an efficacious means to these ends.
Pragmatically speaking, this professionally privileged realm offers an appealing
target for racial diversification initiatives. Generally viewed as elitist to begin
with, the process of hiring and promotion
in these firms has long been sus77
claim.
many
as
neutral
race
as
not
as
pected
Although overt exhibitions of racist attitudes are unlikely at any of the major
law firms and, indeed, for the past several years most of the major firms have
expressed the desire to increase their percentages of minority lawyers, the fact
remains that the latter simply has not occurred. While there are few express indications that non-blacks who practice in these firms are skeptical of the capabilities of African American attorneys, the impact of these racial apprehensions
becomes evident in the paucity of black lawyers who are hired by the elite firms
and the even smaller number who stay with their firms, make partner, and then
elect to remain after achieving this exalted status. Whereas at least some, albeit
limited, measurable progress has been made by African Americans within the
judiciary, when it comes to the major corporate law firms, African American
"progress" has remained completely out of step with all other phases of the
profession-and American society as a whole. 78 Decades behind the rest of the
nation, law firms must admit that racial bias plays a part in explaining the
black/white disparity. Nonetheless, the stubborn resistance to integration displayed by many of the law firms continues to set them apart from many other
employers in the legal profession. Hence, the dismal reality of their diversity
track records limits their ability to argue convincingly that affirmative diversifica-

Color Line 215 (1996) ("In the '60s and before, acts of hatred had symbolic clarity because blacks and whites

shared an ecology of race. A church burning was undisguised racial hatred. A cross burning was meant to
intimidate 'uppity' blacks .... But in our more racially murky era-an era in which the ecology of race is
much more complex and choked with half-discarded symbols and muddied signs-our skills of interpretation have to be more keen, our readings more nuanced. There's little doubt that most of the vitriolic expressions of racism have been forced underground by the success of the '60s black freedom struggles. But

symptoms of racial antipathy persist, even if they're harder to prove and far more difficult to analyze.").
77. Doreen Weisenhaus, Still a Long Wa, to Go For Women, Minorties, Nat L J 1, 50 (Feb 8, 1988)
("The Commission on Minorities in Profession ... in 1986 ... reported that 'residual discrimination still
persists in some of the legal profession, and that some hiring and promotion processes and criteria continue to limit minorities' opportunities even though the)' are not intended to do so."'(emphasis added)); Anna
Snider, Minory Progressin Law ProfessionAppears Stalled, New York LJ 1 (Aug 7, 1998).

78. Richard Zitrin and Carol M. Langford, Firm Against That Flag, Legal Times 68 (Mar 27, 2000).
79. Watters, 10 Natl Bar Assn Mag at 1 (cited in note 18) ("The under-representation of blacks in
large law firms shows no sign of changing ...
number of African American associates in the largest

Mhe

250 national law firms demonstrated little growth during the past five years moving from 1,311 to 1,641.
On the partnership level, the past five years have produced no growth in the number of black partners as a

percentage of white partners (1.2 percent), and a slight increase in actual numbers moving from 287 to
351."); Chambliss, Miles to Go 2000 at 6 (cited in note 26) ("Minority representation in upper-level jobs
remains minuscule, especially in the for-profit sector. Minority representation among law partners remains
less than 3 percent in most cities [and] among general counsel in the Fortune 500 is 2.8 percent.").
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tion measures will unfairly tip the scales in favor of black candidates. 0
While certainly not the only avenue to or prerequisite qualification for the
bench, corporate law firm employment remains a vital portal not only to the
judiciary but also to many other important positions in the legal profession.
"Corporate positions are not only important in directing economic affairs, but
also as symbolic indicators of increasing black participation in the corporate
sector. They represent points of access and influence on government and other
private sector activities."81 Indeed, even after black lawyers excel in other areas,
many still doubt their ability to fulfill positions of leadership, at least until their
facility in the corporate sector has been demonstrated. Remembering her interview with the judicial appointment committee chairman, Judge Constance Motley writes, "Even though I had argued many cases in the Supreme Court and in
federal courts, some lawyers, who were not interested enough to inquire as to
the cases I had handled, thought I was not qualified for a seat on the federal
bench. They viewed the federal district court as a place where Wall Street lawyers represented major American corporations
and not where civil rights litiga82
York."
New
in
not
especially
place,
took
tion
As long as black lawyers are more or less excluded from major corporate
law opportunities, they remain at a serious disadvantage in competing for seats
within the judiciary as well as for inclusion in other significant legal, political,
and economic undertakings in American society:
Mhe impact of the... problem of the lack of Black lawyers surely extends beyond the lack of representation in the elective political process. Indeed the impact
of this scarcity extends in great measure to those 'power pockets' and influential
political lobbies in American society that historically have created, controlled, or
dominated the process of societal decision. In this arena, the need for Black lawyers in the offices of major law firms, corporations, brokerage houses, and
banks-the real power pockets in American society-is plainly apparent.

80. Alexander Stille, Little Room at the Top for Blacks, Hirpanics, Nati L J 1 (Dec 23, 1985) ("In what
has become an increasingly clear trend, the number of women at the nation's largest law firms is rising
rapidly, while the proportion of black and Hispanic lawyers has remained virtually unchanged'); Rita
Henley Jansen, MinoritiesDidn't Share in Firm Growth, Nai L J 1, 28 (1990) ("At the beginning of the decade,
women constituted 2.8 percent of all partners in the largest 151 law firms; at its close, the percentage had
more than tripled-9.2 percent of all partners in the largest firms were female. But there is not such good
news for minorities. In 1981, 0.47 percent of all large-firm partners were black. In 1989, black partners still
had not accounted for even 1 percent of the total'). See also Abel, American Lawers at 105-06 (cited in note
9) (noting the generally small numbers in law firms through the 1980s); Wilkins and Gulati, 84 Cal L Rev at
564 (cited in note 29) ("Virtually all the blacks who start at a given elite law firm leave before becoming
partner.").
81. A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Sodety 248 (National Academy 1989) (Gerald David
Jaynes and Robin M. Williams, Jr., eds). See also Dunn, 4 Hofstra L Rev at 298-99, 302 (cited in note 1).
82. Motley, EqualJustice UnderLaw at 218-19 (cited in note 16).
83. Harry T. Edwards, A New Rolefor the Black Law Graduate:A Reaity or an Illusion?,69 Mich L Rev
1407, 1415 (1971). Indeed, the professional backgrounds of federal judges, available at the Federal Judiciary
website, may lend some empirical support for the observations of Judge Motley and Judge Edwards. A
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As was the case in the pre-Civil Rights Era, excluding blacks from prerequisites to authoritative or other elite positions has the same effect as expressly
barring them from competing for the ultimate position itself. 84 By contrast,
meaningful racial diversification of the elite corporate law environment will provide equal opportunity for today's black lawyer to demonstrate her ability to
excel in positions of significant responsibility and authority. It will better enable
the black judicial hopeful to garner the kind of professional experience typically
regarded as prerequisite to qualifying for the bench. This will also give aspiring
black judges greater access to the legal, business, and political inroads of power,
which can lead to judicial and other high office.
When blacks routinely hold such prestigious positions as practicing corporate attorneys, non-blacks both within and outside of the profession will begin
to grow comfortable with the idea of blacks sitting not only as judges but also in
other positions of high authority. "Through practice ... people can weaken the
mental links that connect minorities to negative stereotypes and strengthen the
ones that connect them to conscious positive beliefs." 85 But as New York State
Judge Bruce Wright's anecdote teaches, as long as relatively few blacks hold
these positions, their numbers will remain insufficient to overcome the stereotypes and biases that continue to impede black progress:
One afternoon, during a trial, I felt so faint and weak I could not carry on .... I
was taken out of the courthouse lashed to a stretcher .... In the emergency room
of the hospital, I was placed in a curtained-off area where there were two
beds .... On one there was a white man, obviously one of the poor derelicts now
and then brought in from the Bowery. He appeared to be in a state of joyous alcoholic bewilderment. He needed a shave; neither his soiled sneakers nor his socks
matched; he drooled a bit and sang softly in garbled syllables. As I watched him
from my bed, I felt pangs of pity .... I felt guilty for being dressed in a threepiece suit and a clean shirt. I heard a nurse outside the curtained area say, 'Hurry,
doctor, we have a judge who is ill.' A white doctor parted the curtains ... looked
at me and then at the white derelict. He hurried to the side of the white man, lifted
his wrist,
as though to test his pulse, and said, 'Judge, what seems to be the mat86
ter?'

cursory comparison of the career paths of the sixty-six black district judges appointed since 1980 with
those of their white counterparts shows that while most of the appointees, regardless of race, gained experience in both the private and public sectors before ascending to the bench, 24 percent of the black
judges had not been in private practice. This observation is not only consistent with the historical exclusion
of blacks from many private practice opportunities, but it also implicates the question of whether black
lawyers might increase their chances of becoming judges if their professional backgrounds mirrored more
closely the typical careers of white attorneys.
84. See Bartnoff, 73 Colum L Rev at 1621 (cited in note 60) ("To the extent that Blacks and Puerto
Ricans are disproportionately screened out by the examination for Assistant Principal [in the New York
City school system] they are not only prevented from becoming Assistant Principals but they are kept out
of the pool of eligibles for future examinations for the position of Principal as well.').
85. Murphy Paul, 31 Psychol Today at 82 (cited in note 52).
86. Bruce Wright, Black Robes, White Jiisice 24-25 (1987); Mabry, 42 Wayne L Rev at 1385 (cited in

The Road to the Bench 163

2001]

DIVERSIFICATION OF THE ELITE CORPORATE LAW FiRMs AND
THE ELIMINATION OF (SUBLIMINAL) RAcIAL BAS IN SUBJECTIVE

CONTEXTS
Increasing the number of black lawyers in the major corporate law firms
may not only lead to a rise in the number of African American judges, but it
could also have a positive effect on the racial attitudes of many non-black lawyers, including those who will eventually play critical roles in the selection and
appointment of, or who may themselves one day become, judges.8 7 Concededly,
there are probably at least a few lawyers, and perhaps even some judges, who
harbor definite, albeit appropriately masked, racial bias toward African Americans, especially when assessing blacks who hold or seek positions that only
whites are expected to occupy.88 It may well be that in some cases opening up
broader opportunities for black lawyers will do little to dispel preconceived racial attitudes.
Moreover, considering the extent to which issues of race permeate American society, it is simply unrealistic to expect that even those few judges who
have actually had some concrete diversity training will respond appropriately to
allegations of racial discrimination in connection with highly subjective assessments and decisions:
The percentage of judges who consciously discriminate is likely minuscule. Far
more failures to scrutinize employment actions can be explained by an unconscious discrimination. Many judges simply may not recognize when a discriminatory employment practice is before them, especially where the practice involves facialy neutral subjective criteria .... Having personally succeeded in the system,
they have no reason to doubt the existence of a genuine meritocracy or its uniform
applicability .... Short of situations of egregious discrimination .. . they may
blithely find for the defendant, feeling confident they have considered all aspects
of the case. Such judges are not moral reprobates; they feel their duties are connote 52) ("a few strokes of a pen will not erase racism in America. Racism will not disappear ovemight just
because Congress passed new legislation").
39 BC L Rev at 139-40 (cited in note 2) ("A racially homogeneous work environment
87. If'll,
may... permit judicial indifference to minority racial perspectives and issues. A racially diverse work
environment for judges may have exactly the opposite effect.'. See also Renee Loth, [Governor] Weid's Hunt
forJudges,Boston Globe A19 (July 7, 1991).
88. Jane Howard-Martin, A Critical naaysis ofjudidal Opinions in ProfessionalEmployment Diaiimination
Cases, 26 Howard L J 723, 740-41 (1983) ("Some members of the judiciary may consciously discriminate
against minorities and women. Xenophobes, chauvinists or racists may feel that the professions offer
inappropriate employment to women, Blacks or ethnic Americans. Perhaps the entire group is considered
ignorant or incapable of competence. More probably, conscious discrimination is motivated by fears of a
threat to the American system, with its current distribution of power favoring white males. They may
recognize that the dominance of WASP males requires the existence of an underclass and as more members of this underclass gain power, they will demand fundamental change and have the ability to effectuate
these changes ....For judges who consciously discriminate, an easy way to deter access of the underclass
to positions of control is to refuse to question the decisions of employers whose practices have began the
process, a conspiracy of sorts to maintain control.').
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sciously performed. They are merely to be chided for
their nearsightedness, and
89
must be introduced to the realities of discrimination.

Given that the traditional career path to judgeship is one not especially hospitable to blacks, non-black lawyers who pursue such roads to the bench are not
likely to have had significant experience working with African Americans. Consequently, they are less likely to have developed firsthand, impartial (much less
favorable) impressions of black attorneys' skills or to appreciate some of the
more subtle manifestations of covert or subliminal bias in elite and other highly
90
subjective contexts.
If black lawyers are generally excluded from the traditional training grounds
of judges and other leaders, there are limited opportunities and incentives for
non-blacks in the profession to question their individual racial attitudes and few
professional situations in which non-black lawyers encounter challenges to any
conscious or subliminal biases they may have. Pursuing the majority of one's
legal career in professional environments that tout excellence, but in which there
are few if any blacks, is likely to do very little to reinforce even consciousbeliefs in
racial equality, and even less to dismantle subliminal biases about blacks and
their professional or intellectual capabilities:
Judges are not immune from our culture's racism, nor can they escape the psychological mechanisms that render us all, to some extent, unaware of our racist beliefs
....Judges continue to come primarily from elite white backgrounds. They undoubtedly share the values and perceptions of that subculture, which may well be
insensitive or even antagonistic
toward the values, needs, and experiences of
1
blacks and other minorties.

All of the social processes that engender racial prejudice, most of which occur outside of conscious thinking, are mutually reinforcing. Indeed, there is little
in routine American society to counteract such impressions, subliminal or otherwise. More often than not, American social culture tends to support and even
reward majority individuals when they embrace these preconceptions, which
89. Id at 741-42. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski and Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside fbe JudidalMind,
86 Cornell L Rev 777, 779-80 (2001) ("Legal realists have argued that judges make choices that reflect their
political ideology; proponents of critical legal studies have complained that judges favor the existing power
structure; critical race and feminist scholars have argued that race and gender heavily influence judicial
decisions; and law and economics scholars have asserted that judges make self-serving decisions designed
to advance their political fortunes. Our research, however, identifies a more fundamental source of systematic judicial error wholly apart from political orientation and self-interest, the very nature of human
thought can induce judges to make consistent and predictable mistakes in particular situations.").
90. Moloney Smith, 28 U Rich L Rev at 186 (cited in note 18) ("there are different pathways to the
bench which may influence the perspective of a judge. Most white male judges are prosperous, having risen
through the ranks in a traditional fashion [and are] more likely to have private law firm careers, ties to the
local community and the appropriate political contributions.").
91. Lawrence, 39 Stan L Rev at 380 (cited in note 57); Guthrie, et al, 86 Comell L Rev at 784, 80516 (cited in note 89); Kenneth L. Karst,JudgingandBelonging, 61 S Cal L Rev 1957, 1958 (1988).
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mischaracterize various differences between members of the majority and racial
outgroups. 92 This is particularly true for non-black individuals engaged in elite
professional environments. What can reasonably be expected of non-black professionals who spend years forging their skills in environments in which, at
every level of competition, the "best and brightest" are virtually all white? In
proposing or evaluating judicial candidates, they are largely bereft of any personal experience with which to assess or recommend black aspirants to judicial
office. And should one of these elite, non-black lawyers herself become a judge,
what level of racial sensitivity can be legitimately expected of her, whose first
significant professional encounter with a black attorney occurs when he appears
in her courtroom? To say the least, it seems less than reasonable to expect that
judge to approach ecumenically allegations of racial discrimination, especially
those raised by black professionals in connection with the very same highly subjective and predominantly white employment situations from which that judge
came to her seat on the bench.93
Indeed, some commentators have observed that the monochromatic career
experiences of many judges seem to have rendered them incapable of approaching such cases through any means other than a search for traditional indicia of
overt racial anirus.94 And in the absence of these outmoded and largely irrelevant guideposts, some judges seem unable to ferret out any but the bluntly obvious discriminatory conduct:
There is a disturbing trend among the judiciary... to avoid an in-depth review of
a professional employment discrimination case. Some judges are seemingly oblivious to the possibility of the existence of discrimination in professional jobs. Others, while recognizing that employment discrimination exists, go out of their way
to avoid finding the practices of a professional employer suspect. Plaintiff's evidence is treated to a superficial examination or weighed in light of the defendant's
overall95attitude despite significant evidence of discrimination in the case before
them.

92. See Lawrence, 39 Stan L Rev at 338 (cited in note 57).
93. Moloney Smith, 28 U Rich L Rev at 192, 194 (cited in note 18) ("Recognizing that a judge has a
proceedings ....
If the critical
particular perspective does not negate the element of impartiality in judicial
step of acknowledgment does not occur, the perspective can influence the behavior of the judge without
any conscious recognition .... Today, many problems recognized as legitimate causes of action are related
to gender or race .... A member of the establishment... may be resistant to change. Connection with the
judged, or the lack thereof, will affect the evaluation of the facts."). See also Tobias, 47 Am U L Rev at
955-56 (cited in note 42).
94. See generally Moloney Smith, 28 U Rich L Rev 179 (cited in note 18).
95. Howard-Martin, 26 Howard LJ at 724 (cited in note 88). See Kathryn Abrams, CriicaStraegy
and the Judidal Evasion of Difference, 85 Comell L Rev 1426, 1433 (2000) ("Perhaps the most invidious
development has occurred in the Title VII liability context: the courts have deployed critical theorists'
nuanced tools of description against those theorists' very antidiscrimination goals.... [Some] judges use
these nuanced accounts, not to render a more complex picture of group based identity, but to deny that
group members have suffered discrimination.... These varied forms of judicial difference evasion make
clear that critical analyses of difference and group-based discrimination-illUuminating though they may
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In those cases in which a judge is unable to perceive actual, albeit subtle or
subliminal, bias, the end injustice extends beyond the wrongful denial of a deserved legal remedy. Perhaps worse, the (unknowing) perpetrator has now been
affirmatively reassured that she need not reexamine her attitudes or conduct
because she has receivedjudicialimprimaturthat she is behaving in afair and equitable manner. "When the intent requirement [in discrimination jurisprudence] produces a
finding of no constitutional injury, this finding is generalized to mean that no
96
actual injury has occurred.
This, of course, is one of the principal reasons that some commentators are
so vehemently critical of the prevailing judicial approach to racial discrimination
suits, particularly where such suits involve elite and other subjective employment
situations. In general, the courts currently reject evidence of disproportionate or
disparate impact of the complained of conduct on the affected racial group as
dispositive proof of actionable, that is intentional, racial discrimination in an
individual case. Instead, a showing of a specific, conscious intent by the defendant
97
to discriminate is required to sustain a discrimination verdict.
Consequently, the individual plaintiff's recovery for racial discrimination is
typically dependent upon the ability of the factfinder, herself likely afflicted by a
degree of (at least) subliminal bias, to recognize and condemn overt racial discrimination in all its myriad forms. In cases involving less than overt conduct,
however, it is necessary that the factfinder not only ascertain covert and even
subliminal racial bias, but also vilify the racial attitudes, misconceptions, and
related conduct of a defendant whose professional or social experiences likely
mirror her own. After forging these socio-intellectual divides, the factfinder, in
order to return a verdict for the plaintiff, must believe that the defendant's discriminatory conduct, whether overt, covert, or subliminal, was intenionalyl harmful, resolving thereby all pivotal inferences against the defendant and in favor of
a plaintiff who does not fit the conventional or subliminal notion of "qualified"

that critical analyses of difference and group-based discrimination-illuminating though they may be-are

not being embraced by mainstream judicial decision makers.").
96. Lawrence, 39 Stan L Rev at 325 n 31 (cited in note 57).
97.

See generally Tracy E. Higgins and Laura A. Rosenbury, Ageny, Equality, and Antidiscriination

Law, 85 Cornell L Rev 1194 (2000); Foster, 72 Tulane L Rev 1065 (cited in note 58); Lawrence, 39 Stan L
Rev 317 (cited in note 57); Pollard, 74 Wash L Rev 913 (cited in note 59). Evidence of disparate impact or
treatment can be used, however, to demonstrate institutional bias or a pattern and practice of discrimination against an entire class of complainants. See, for example, e. christi cunningham, The Rise of Identiy
Politics I: The Mytb of the Protected Class in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 30 Conn L Rev 441, 447-50
(1998) (comparing individual and group claims in the context of Tite VII disparate treatment and disparate
impact claims). See also Higgins and Rosenbury, 85 Cornell L Rev at 1205 ("Disparate impact doctrine is
the area of federal employment discrimination law that most directly emphasizes group identity and its
relationship to employment patterns .... The simple idea behind this doctrine is that employment practices
that disproportionately disadvantage or exclude members of certain groups must be eliminated unless
justified by business necessity. Employers are responsible for the removal of such barriers whether or not
they were erected for exclusionary purposes. ....
The standard is one of neutrality of impact, not neutrality
of intent.').
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in the first place.
A possible illustration of this process may be the well known case of Lawrence Mungin.9 8 Mungin was a black Harvard law graduate who sued his corporate law firm employer when he was passed over for partnership. Mungin had
joined the firm as a lateral associate with the understanding that he would be
considered for partnership within a year. However, few senior-level assignments
reached Mungin's desk in the ensuing twelve months, and Mungin was ultimately denied partnership on the stated grounds that he had not demonstrated
partnership level capability.
In his discrimination lawsuit, Mungin alleged, among other things, that because of his race, the firm denied him a fair chance to demonstrate his capabilities as an experienced attorney and thereby provide him with a genuine opportunity to attain partnership. Mungin adduced evidence of mistreatment by his
superiors to support his claim that the firm's failure to provide him with appropriate assignments was racially motivated. A racially mixed jury heard this evidence, concluded that it proved racial discrimination, and awarded Mungin $2.5
million in damages.
On appeal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, two white judges
on a three-judge panel voted to reverse the jury verdict in its entirety.99 These
judges determined that because there was evidence that some white associates
were also treated badly by the firm, as a matter of law the incidents described by
Mungin constituted radall neutral mistreatment.1°° The reversing judges may not
have considered sufficiently that some people mistreat different people for different reasons and that upon hearing the evidence as to the paricularways in
which Mungin was mistreated the jury concluded that the motivation for
Mungin's mistreatment was racial (perhaps even covert or subliminal) in nature.10 1 In reversing the jury's determination of the facts as a matter of law, however, these judges effectively substituted their view that Mungin's mistreatment
98. See Muingin v Katten, Muchin & Zavir, 116 F3d 1549 (DC Cir 1997). This case is the subject of
Barrett's The GoodBlark (cited in note 54).
99. The third member of the panel, ChiefJudge Harry Edwards, voted to affirm in part and remand
for reconsideration as to the amount of the damage award. See Mungin, 116 F3d at 1558.
100. According to Barrett, Mungin's law firm was a place of "equal opportunity unhappiness." Barrett, The GoodBlack at 3(cited in note 54).
101. Among the incidents about which Mungin presented evidence to the jury were: his exclusion from
bankruptcy practice group meetings despite the fact that he was a senior associate in the group; the calling in
of a white associate from another office to pitch the firm's bankruptcy capability to an important new client;
being given paralegal level assignments; and once being invited to an important client meeting only to learn
that his sole responsibility was that of carrying the overhead projector for the presentation. See Barrett, The
Good Black at 47, 101, 123, 125, 190 (cited in note 54). See also Higgins and Rosenbury, 85 Comell L Rev at
1212-13 (cited in note 97) ("Court[s are willing] to credit motivations other than discrimination for an employer's pretextual explanation of a hiring decision.., in disparate impact cases.... [qourts are increasingly
willing to regard employers' decisions as neutral with respect to group-based characteristics such as race or
gender and to view the seemingly identity-based consequences of those decisions as resulting from nondiscriminatory or color-blind factors. The doctrinal trend is toward accepting formally neutral decisions at face
value and viewing instances of discrimination as anomalous and irrational.").
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could not have been racially motivated or that, even if it was, any racial disparagement was unintenuionaly inflicted. This substitution may reflect certain subliminal limitations on the part of the reversing judges, rather than the absence of
a "reasonable jury":
Consider the way a white judge might be expected to approach a minority applicant's challenge to a government employment test. Typically the test will have
been developed by other whites (likely white males) based on their own acculturated assumptions about what it takes to do the job ....If, on a particular test,
white applicants as a group outscore minority applicants, that experience tends to
reinforce not only the applicants' belief in the test's validity but also any subconscious assumptions they may have about racial superiority ....
Furthermore, when
a minority candidate goes to court to challenge a test's capacity to predict job performance, the challenge is apt to go against the grain of the judge's own acculturated assumptions about the testing system. The judge, too, has a psychological
stake in the validation of the sorting mechanisms that brought him his own position and status-mechanisms that are the cultural analogues of the challenged test.
The whole system of testing and credentials turns out to be self-perpetuating, with
our judges doing their part.

To focus exclusively on whether the defendant "intentionally" discriminated
(or whether a judge is "deliberately" ignoring indicia of racial bias) in highly subjective contexts is to miss an extremely critical point. Assessing allegations of
discrimination exclusively by the "intentional" commission or omission of overt
acts, or for that matter the presence or application of "racially neutral" criteria,
while largely ignoring or minimizing concrete evidence of disparate impact
seems to produce a disconnect where highly subjective assessments and subliminal racial biases are at issue. 10 3 Traditional notions of intent simply do not
102. Karst, 61 S Cal L Rev at 1961 (cited in note 90). The complex problems raised by Mungin's
story certainly go beyond the issue of subliminal racial bias and the appropriate response in the post-Civil
Rights Era. Questions regarding African American integration and assimilation, its role in the acquisition of
equal social and legal rights, and the function of law in balancing these concerns are also implicated. These
and other issues are explored in greater detail in a forthcoming article, Lookingfor Mr. Good Blac- The Real
Tragedy ofLawrence D. Mungin and 0/her Children of the Dream.
103. Shipler, A County of Strangers at 280-81 (cited in note 25) ("In the realm of proper political discourse, where overt racial slurs can destroy a career, the expression of prejudice takes on a more circuitous
route ....You're not allowed to characterize black people as incompetent, but you may preach the abolition of affirmative action because it promotes 'unqualified' blacks over 'qualified' whites. In American
public life, where itis no longer admissible to assert the mental inferiority of black people, itis perfectly
fine to argue policies that grow out of that assumption, so long as the core stereotype is left unstated.").
See also Higgins and Rosenbury, 85 Cornell L Rev 1194, 1195-96 (cited in note 97) ("the Supreme Court
increasingly has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause as a mandate for the state to treat citizens as if
they were equal--as a limitation on the state's ability to draw distinctions on the basis of characteristics
such as race and, to a lesser extent, gender.... In the context of race, the court has struck down not only
race-specific policies designed to harm the historically oppressed, but race-conscious policies designed to
foster racial equality. Although in theory the Court has left open the possibility that benign uses of race
may be constitutional under some set of facts, in practice it has yet to identify such a policy since it
adopted strict scrutiny across the board. [And a]sthe Supreme Court narrowed the scope of benign racebased categories permitted by the Constitution, political forces have launched attacks on affirmative action
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account for the fact that subjective decisions and attitudes about race are often
influenced by factors that cannot be accurately characterized either as intentional
(consciously deliberate) or unintentional (entirely fortuitous and uninfluenced by
the actor's express beliefs or opinions). Consequently, to require proof of conscious motivation as a prerequisite to legal recognition that a decision has been
improperly infected by racial bias is to overlook much of what has been discovered about how the human mind actually works and the profound importance
of the history of American race relations in the development of the individual
and collective American subconscious. 1°4 The disconnect between enlightened
aspirations and the reality of the continuing legacy of historical racism merely
provides a 10
breeding
culture for the post-Civil Rights incarnation of racial dis5
crimination.
However the courts ultimately resolve the overall "intent versus impact"
debate, in the interim, genuine diversification of the elite law firms and similar
professional contexts could help make the disagreement more academic than
real. The meaningful inclusion of black lawyers within the elite professional environments could provide the kind of continuous professional interaction with
blacks that many non-black lawyers might utilize in overcoming conscious or
subliminal bias. This could affect some non-black lawyers who have responsibility for corporate attorney recruitment and mentoring, who notably play or will
play a prominent role in the selection of the judiciary, and who themselves as-

policies at both the state and federal levels.').
104. Lawrence, 39 Stan L Rev at 322-23 (cited in note 57); Pollard, 74 Wash L Rev at 925 (cited in
note 59); Armour, Ngronpobia and Reasonable Racism at 73 (cited in note 58). See also Henry L. Chambers,
Jr., Getting It Right. Uncertainty and Errorin the New Disparate Treatment Para gm, 60 Albany L Rev 1, 22-23
(1996).
105. Higgins and Rosenbury, 85 Cornell L Rev at 1195-96, 1215-20 (cited in note 97). See also Lawrence, 39 Stan L Rev at 349 (cited in note 57) ("by only suspecting laws that classify by race on their face or
are the result of overtly self-conscious racial motivation, the theory stops an important step short of locating and eliminating the defect it has identified. Where a society has recently adopted a moral ethic that
repudiates racial disadvantaging for its own sake, governmental decisionmakers are as likely to repress their
racial motives as they are to lie to courts or to attempt after-the-fact rationalizations of classifications that
are not racial on their face but that do have disproportionate racial impact'); Pollard, 74 Wash L Rev at
932 (cited in note 59) ("Because overt racism and sexism are on the decline and employers have become
sophisticated about discrimination law, direct evidence of discriminatory animus is rare. Many plaintiffs
must resort to proving discrimination indirectly by presenting evidence that the defendant fabricated pretextual reasons for the adverse decision in order to hide its true discriminatory purpose. The plaintiff must
prove that the defendant is not only bigoted, but is lying to the court and jury-a difficult burden to meet
when the defendant is unaware of the unconscious bias and a jury can see the real shock and indignation at
being accused of bigotry and perjury."). Some commentators argue, however, that the intent approach can
be construed as encompassing redress for unconscious bias. Foster discusses the proposition that "there
are three levels of intent-specific, general, and unconscious-that can violate the Equal Protection
Clause." "Intent" under this broader construction "can range from a specific desire to harm the affected
group, to general knowledge that harm is substantially certain to occur, to an unconscious bias towards the
affected group... [B]y continuing to perpetuate the 'myth' of one static intent, the current judicial approach to discrimination cases] conceals the range of its potential for identifying racial (and other forms of)
discrimination." Poster, 72 Tulane L Rev at 1072 (cited in note 58).
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pire to the bench. "The way to get there," according to one major law firm's
managing partner, "is to reach a critical mass of diversity. Once you get that
critical mass, diversity becomes accepted, it becomes the norm. If that happens,
10 6
other things will take care of themselves."'
Preconceived notions are more likely to be changed by drawing attention to
their inaccuracy and by providing for regular, concrete encounters that further
undermine or disprove them. As the opening quotation of this Article declares:
"Speak thou with us and we will hear. . . ."107 Indeed, society's post-Civil Rights
Era experience would seem to validate this approach. How many vocations today considered "women" or "minority" jobs were previously the exclusive province of white men? 08 Bringing meaningful integration to the major corporate
law firms improves the odds that conscious and subliminal biases against blacks
by professionally cloistered lawyers will be effectively challenged. In the case of
the lawyer who will one day play a role in assessing the qualifications of black
judicial candidates, such biases will be challenged before she is called upon to
undertake these critical, subjective evaluations. And in the case of the lawyer
who is a future judge, these biases will be challenged before she reaches the
bench. 0 9 All of this increases the likelihood that the effects of any lingering,
subliminal racial bias will be curtailed, perhaps even eliminated in these contexts
0
or at least appropriately redressed in the courts."

106. James Podgers, Losing Numbers,July-86 ABA J 90 (2000).
107. Exodus 20:19. See Pollard, 74 Wash L Rev at 922 (cited in note 59) ('To break the bad habit of
unconscious negative and automatic discriminatory attitudes, a person must consciously activate unbiased
beliefs each time a stereotype is automatically triggered. The more the individual does this, the more accessible the unprejudiced belief becomes, and at some point the egalitarian belief's accessibility will 'rival' the
automatic response."); Lawrence, 39 Stan L Rev at 343 (cited in note 57) ("A crucial factor in the process
that produces unconscious racism is the tacitly transmitted cultural stereotype. If an individual has never
known a black doctor or lawyer or is exposed to blacks only through mass media where they are portrayed
in the stereotyped roles of comedian, criminal, musician, or athlete, he is likely to deduce that blacks as a
group are naturally inclined toward certain behavior and unfit for certain roles.'); Armour, Negrophobia and
Reasonable Racism at 75 (cited in note 58) ("Tacit understandings instill stereotypes in ways that escape
conscious detection .... If an individual has never known a Black professional or has a mental medley of
Black images primarily composed of the comedian, criminal, musician, or athlete stereotypes, no unexpected barriers have materialized to force a detour in his development of negative attitudes toward
Blacks.").
108. See, for example, Hacker, Two Nations at 112-19 (cited in note 53).
109. Wright, Black Robes, While Jusice at 6 (cited in note 86) ("At the University of Wisconsin, the
members of a white fraternity made some candidates for membership paint their faces black and conduct a
mock slave auction. Such an occurrence would be little more than an undergraduate prank, immature
humor, except for one thing- Those white students will one day become lawyers, public officials, jurors or
judges, unshriven of their pro-slavery sentiments.").
110. Moloney Smith, 28 U Rich L Rev at 197 (cited in note 18) ("The judiciary is an important institution which remains dominated by white males of similar backgrounds .... It is important for women,
and men of color, to gain representation in this powerful institution. It is a question of power and status, of
empowering segments of society and permanently eliminating... stereotypes, myths and biases.').
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CONCLUSION

If the cases outlawing segregation were wrongly decided, then they ought to be
overruled. One can go further if dominant professional opinion ever forms and
be overruled,
decided, then they will
settles on the belief that they were wrongly
1 11
slowly or all at once, openly or sikntj.

The societal advances essential to remedying the unequal access to legal justice still endured by black Americans obviously must go beyond judicial appointments or elite corporate law firm hiring. Overt, covert, and subliminal racial bias against blacks not only continues to impede African American progress,
but "[t]he historical context of slavery has had profound meanings to, and effects on, not only those who suffered from it but also those whose ancestors
Regardless of how differently its benefits are distributed, all
benefited from it.
American subjects continue to live out its effects."'1 2 Especially in elite and
other highly subjective selection contexts, subliminal racial prejudice continues
to work against blacks, even in the complete absence of conscious racial bias.
Thus, the current myopic preoccupation with overt discriminatory acts and socalled "race neutral" criteria ignores the "don't ask/don't tell" incarnation of
racial bias in the post-Civil Rights Era and contravenes the acculturated intelligence and everyday realities of all Americans, regardless of color.
More important than what people say about a belief, a practice, or a law is
History informs us that explicit repeal is often
how they actually feel about it.
unnecessary when individuals can effectuate the neutering of laws or other express assurances of individual rights and liberties through collective evisceration
of their spirit, despite adherence to their letter.11 3 Crucial to changing the way
that some people feel about those who are somehow different from them is
impacting their personal experiences, and doing so repeatedly. For all but the
most ardent racist, first-hand interaction with African American attorneys and
other black professionals who are performing in elite and substantively competitive positions should not only erode explicit or subconscious bias but also replace such preconceptions with affirmative expectations of black competence.
It is also important to articulate expressly that this particular emphasis on
greater opportunities for African American attorneys and other professionals
should not be misconstrued as merely another instance in which it becomes the
victim's responsibility to uplift and enlighten her oppressor. To the contrary, the
idea proposed here is to undertake no more than dearing the way toward ensur-

111. Black, 69 Yale LJ at 421 (cited in note 6)(emphasis added).
112. Jane Flax, TheAmericanDream in Black and White: The Clarence Thomas Hearings36 (Cornell 1998).
113. See, for example, Frank H. Wu, Petpecive, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution G2 (July 30, 2000)
(discussing a CIA agent's admitted reliance on racial profiling in identifying and investigating a scientist
who was a naturalized citizen from Taiwan as an espionage suspect).
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ing that blacks receive the same chance to demonstrate their skills and talents
that most whites already enjoy. The mere reality of more African Americans in
high positions and the impact of their competentperformanceshould prove sufficient to
eliminate eventually the corollary problem of blacks being held to higher or otherwise unfair standards of performance.
Given that at least part of the problem may be subconscious rather than
overt bias, for some people simply being made aware of their subliminal prejudices will be sufficient to spur them toward appropriate, voluntary corrective
action. Specifically with respect to the legal profession and the elite enclaves
therein, increasing concrete initiatives from the ABA and the NBA would also
help. And as for the genuinely impenitent racists, future victims of discrimination in elite contexts should begin to reassess the efficacy of traditional, individual-plaintiff/monetary-recovery litigation, in favor of more creative application
of class action strategies and institutional consent decree style remedies.
Including African Americans within the elite professional echelons broadens
the professional vistas for black lawyers and ameliorates the professional experience of their non-black peers. It can also enhance everyday opportunities for the
routine challenge of racial misconceptions. Such concrete efforts to confront the
depth and breadth of the legacy of racism in American society are the next critical step in rising above and beyond it.

